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The most unhappy hours in our lives are those in which we recollect
times past to our own blushing - If we are immortal that must be the
Hell.
-Keats

I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 26, 1989, a Rhode Island Superior Court judge ordered Stephen J. Germershausen to place the following four-by-sixinch ad with his picture in the Providence Journal-Bulletin: " 'I am
Stephen Germershausen. I am 29 years old. . . . I was convicted of
child molestation.... If you are a child molester, get professional help
immediately, or you may find your picture and name in the paper, and
your life under control of the state.' " 1 Purchasing this ad was a condition of his probation.2
In another era, Germershausen might have been put on a wheel
and had all of the bones in his body cracked, one at a time. 3 During
the late 1600s, he might have been nailed by both ears to a pillory,
then whipped twenty times,4 or branded with an ''M" for molester. 5
He might have been banished or exiled from the United States. 6 Or,
he might have been placed in public stocks7 and forced to apologize
1. Hulick, Molester's Sentence: Photo Ad in Paper, Ariz. Republic, Nov. 9, 1989, at Al, col.
1 (state ed.).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., L. BERKSON, THE CoNCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 4 (1975)
(describing various punitive practices of England and colonial America).
4. See R. SEMMES, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MARYLAND 30 (1938) (describing
punishment given to a witness who was found guilty of perjury).
5. See id. at 35 (reporting that in 1663, Maryland laws provided that county justices should
be given irons for burning "malefactors" - perhaps "H" for "hog stealer,'' "R" for "runaway
slave,'' ''M" for "murderer,'' or "T" for "thief").
6. See id. at 38 (noting that banishment from the province was a penalty in Maryland during
the late 1600s).
7. Id. at 39 (noting that to set a man in stocks was a usual form of punishment in Maryland
during the late 1600s).
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and make financial restitution to the families of his three victims. 8
Electing an alternative not unlike some of these penalties, the Rhode
Island judge imposed on Germershausen a thirty-five-year suspended
sentence, with thirty-five years' probation, and compelled him to publicize his conviction with this newspaper ad. 9
Germershausen's publicity sentence is part of a modest trend in
criminal law. In a smattering of recent cases, several judges have required defendants to apologize publicly to their victims 10 or to wear
signs listing their offenses. 11 An Oregon judge makes some offenders
buy newspaper ads to apologize for their misdeeds. 12 And the State of
Nevada now allows convicted drunk drivers to elect between imprisonment or performing community service while dressed in clothing
that identifies them as drunk drivers. t3
These throwbacks to colonial-type penalties spring from frustration with the conventional options of prison and parole. 14 Prison overcrowding, as well as recurring doubts about the appropriateness and
the effectiveness of incarceration, make imprisonment seem infeasible,
unduly harsh, or otherwise unacceptable in some cases. Yet, many
judges believe that to parole the convicted individual is too lenient. 15
In an attempt to fill this gap, reformers have proposed a host of alternative, creative sentencing strategies, which have begun to reshape
8. In fact, the judge also ordered him to contribute $1000 to a program financed by a rape
crisis center for child victims of sexual assault. See Hulick, supra note 1. The remedy of forcing
a defendant to make financinl restitution to the victim of a crime has a long history in the United
States. Semmes describes an early Maryland case in which a convicted forger was ordered " 'set
on the pillory and loose one of her ears,' " after which she was to be "imprisoned for twelve
months and to pay double costs and damages" to the victim of the forgery. R. SEMMES, supra
note 4, at 32. Money fines, of course, have a far longer history than the American experience, as
the ancient concept of the "wergeld" proves. See P. SPIERENBURG, THE SPECTACLE OP SUPPER•
ING 3 (1984).
9. See Hulick, supra note 1.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 50-55.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 41-49.
12. With Jails Overcrowded, Judges Look for Innovative Sentences to Fit Crimes, Chicago
Daily L. Bull., Feb. 24, 1988, at 1, col. 5. In another recent example, a New Hampshire judge
ordered a man convicted of raping a 10-year-old boy "to buy ads in two locnl newspapers apologizing for his crime." Flogging?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 22, 1991, at 6.
13. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989) (referring to Nev. Rev. Stat.
484.3792 (l)(a)(2)) (1987).
14. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
15. Money fines likewise do not fill the judges' sanctions gap for several reasons. First, many
defendants cannot pay the fines. Second, those who can afford them may pass the cost on to their
"customers." See, e.g., Fisse, Sanctions Against Corporations: The Limitations of Fines and the
Enterprise of Creating Alternatives, in CORRIGIBLE CoRPORATIONS AND UNRULY LAW 137, 140
(B. Fisse & P. French eds. 1985). Moreover, even when fines might be an effective deterrent,
popular opinion may demand that the defendant pay for her misdeeds with more than cash. See
French, Publicity and the Control of Corporate Conduct: Hester Prynne's New Image, in CORRI·
GIBLE CoRPORATIONS AND UN~ULY LAW, supra, at 159-60.
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criminal justice in the United States.1 6
The resort to formal shaming as a criminal sanction is only one of
several attempts to expand the sentencer's arsenal in an effective, inexpensive manner. Formal shaming, however, is perhaps the most sensational of these new penalties. It also exploits, in a particularly
dramatic and explicit fashion, the assumed link between people's sense
of shame and their tendency to observe legal norms. The purpose of
this Article is to analyze whether this link is one that American criminal court judges can, or should, exploit.
I begin with a description of the new shaming sanctions and the
possible justifications for this type of penalty. 17 I then identify both
psychological and anthropological aspects of the phenomenon of
shame, or "losing face." 18 I describe several cultures in which shaming practices are, or were, significant means of sanctioning behavior,
and outline the shared features of these cultures.19
These psychological and anthropological materials, taken together,
suggest that shaming practices are most effective and meaningful when
five conditions are satisfied. First, the potential offenders must be
members of an identifiable group, such as a close-knit religious or ethnic community. Second, the legal sanctions must actually compromise
potential offenders' group social standing. 20 That is, the affected
group must concur with the legal decisionmaker's estimation of what
is, or should be, humiliating to group members. Third, the shaming
must be communicated to the group and the group must withdraw
from the offender - shun her - physically, emotionally, financially,
or otherwise.21 Fourth, the shamed person must fear withdrawal by
the group. 22 Finally, the shamed person must be afforded some means
of regaining community esteem, unless the misdeed is so grave that the
offender must be permanently exiled or demoted. 23
I apply these five characteristics to modem American communities, and speculate about whether formal shaming by contemporary
American criminal courts within their communities makes practical
sense. 24 I argue that the dominant social and cultural traditions in the
16. Malcolm, New Strategies to Fight Crime Go Far Beyond Stiffer Terms and More Cells,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1990, at A16, col. 1.
17. See infra notes 41-92 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 110-96 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 197-257 and accompanying text.
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United States do not reflect the level of interdependence, strong norm
cohesion, and robust communitarianism that tends to characterize cultures in which shaming is prevalent and effective. Moreover, federal
and state law enforcement includes no public ritual or ceremony for
reintegrating or "forgiving" a shamed offender. Given these circumstances, I conclude that public shaming by a criminal court judge will
be, at most, a retributive spectacle that is devoid of other positive community-expressive or community-reinforcing content. Additionally, I
hypothesize that these judicial shamings will not significantly deter
crime in most urban, and likely many nonurban American settings. 25
Finally, I consider whether shaming is a reasonably humane
method of punishing criminals, regardless of its practical effectiveness.
In particular, I address the limiting concerns of proportionality, 26
equality,21 and cruelty. 28 I maintain that these three concerns, which
are raised by all forms of punishment, are particularly strong with
shaming punishments and point against use of these penalties. 29 These
conclusions are relevant to all publicly imposed criminal sanctions to
the extent that all methods of public punishment attempt to exploit
the target community's shared sense of revulsion and shame.
II.

THE REVIVAL

A. Introduction
The revival of shaming springs from profound and widespread dissatisfaction with existing methods of punishment. In particular, many
people, including judges, doubt the effectiveness and humanity of
prison. 30 Yet, the main alternative to prison - parole - is equally
unattractive, both because the community fears the often unmonitored
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See
See
See
See
Id.

infra
infra
infra
infra

notes 209-35 and accompanying text.
notes 262-67 and accompanying text.
notes 268-71 and accompanying text.
note 272 and accompanying text.

American prisons are terribly overcrowded and expensive to run. See, e.g., Finn, Judicial
Responses to Prison Crowding, 67 JUDICATURE 318, 319 (1984) (noting that state prison populations increased 54% between 1973 and 1982); Prison Overcrowding Project Update, Crim. J.
Newsletter, Mar. 28, 1983, at 6; Silas, Homebodies. A.B.A. J., May 1, 1986, at 28, 29 (reporting
that Oklahoma's prison population doubled between 1979 and 1984, prompting the state legislature to expand home detention as an alternative to incarceration); With Jails CA·ercrowded,
Judges Look for Innovative Sentences to Fit Crimes. Chicago Daily L. Bull., Feb. 24, 1988, at 1,
col. 4 (quoting a district court judge who says he imposes novel sentences because the prisons and
detention centers are overcrowded); see generally Farrington & Nuttall, Prison Size, Overcrowding, Prison Violence, and Recidivism, 8 J. CRIM. JUST. 221 (1980); Holbert & Call, The Perspec-

tive of State Correctional Officials on Prison Overcrowding: Causes, Court Orders, and Solutions,
FED. PROBATION, Mar. 1989, at 25; The Prison Overcrowding Crisis, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 1 (1983-1984); Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions ofPrison Confinement: An Analy-
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return of the offender to its neighborhoods, and because most people
believe criminals should not go unpunished. 31
This dissatisfaction with the primary punishment options has led
to experimental, creative sanctions and probation conditions, which
include the "shaming and shunning" practices. The full range of these
experimental alternatives includes furlough programs, 32 community
service sentences,33 home surveillance systems, 34 so-called "shock prosis of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Administration Under the
Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REV. 893 (1977).
Prisons also can be dangerous and deplorable places, as evidenced by the prisoners' rights
decisions of the 1960s-1980s. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520 (1979), Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396
(1974); Tousaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986); Badgley v. Santacroce, 800 F.2d 33
(2d Cir. 1986); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983
(1971); Hamilton v. Covington, 445 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Ark. 1978). Finn reports that "[b]y
1976, over 19,000 petitions for relief had been filed in federal courts, representing over 15 percent
of the entire civil filings ..•. By the end of 1982, 31 states were under court order to remedy
crowded conditions alone, and another nine were facing similar court challenges." Finn, supra,
at 264.
31. Objections to lenient sentences and to uneven enforcement of the criminal penalties led to
the adoption of mandatory sentencing guidelines in the federal system. See U.S. SENTENCING
CoMMN., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL (1988). The guidelines were upheld as
constitutional in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). Nevertheless, the guidelines
continue to be extremely controversial. See, e.g., Bishop, Mandatory Sentences in Drug Cases: Is
the Law Defeating Its Purpose?, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1990, at B16, col. 3. The nature and tenor
of these debates reveal how divided and confused attitudes about proper punishment ends remain
in the United States, even among the "experts."
32. See, e.g., R. STEGGERDA & P. VENEZIA, CoMMUNITY-BASED ALTERNATIVES TO
TRAomoNAL CoRRECTioNs 9-12 (1974) (research conducted by the Research Center of the
National Council on Crime and Delinquency describing community-based alternatives to incarceration, including work-release, residential facilities, fines, and probation with support services);
Unger, Private Pomona Company Has an Alternative to Jail, L.A. Daily J., May 19, 1986, § II, at
1, col. 3 (describing California's experimentation with privately run work furlough programs, in
lieu of incarceration).
33. See, e.g., Doctor Sentenced to Heal in India, Natl. L.J., Aug. 25, 1980, at 3, col. 1 (psychiatrist convicted of Medicare fraud ordered to give medical services in India); With Jails Overcrowded, Judges Look for Innovative Sentences to Fit Crimes, Chicago Daily L. Bull., Feb. 24,
1988, at 1, col. 4 (describing Chicago judge's sentencing of a defendant who harassed blacks to
200 hours of community service with the NAACP); Wise, Was the Judge's ''Sentence" OffBase?,
Natl. L.J., Mar. 5, 1984, at 43, col. 1 (baseball player Al Bumbry sentenced to 20 minutes of
signing autographs for speeding); Sentenced to Happy Hours, Natl. L.J., Apr. 12, 1982, at 39, col.
3 (cocktail lounge owner ordered to provide liquor to geriatric ward oflocal hospital after lounge
was cited for overcrowding; pizza parlor owner ordered to provide pizzas to hospital patients;
and music student convicted of drunk driving ordered to play concerts for patients). For a critical reaction to community service penalties, both as an insufficiently harsh penalty and as a
perversion of the concept of public service as activity inspired by public spiritedness, not a court
order, see Gordon, Community Service, Mark of Disgrace, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1990, at A17,
col. 3.
34. "Home detention" is the pretrial or post-conviction, full- or part-time restriction of a
defendant to her own home. See, e.g., Silas, supra note 30, at 28 (describing sentences of home
confinement, used by a majority of the states as alternatives to prison); Gombossy, Florist Placed
Under 'House A"est' in Credit Cord Scam, Natl. L.J., Aug. 11, 1986, at 6, col. 1 (discussing
house arrest as response to prison overcrowding in a Connecticut case, and in other jurisdictions); A Prisoner in His Own Home, Natl. L.J., Feb. 15, 1982, at 35, col. 3 (describing sentence
confining burglar to his mother's property for two years); Berg, Home Detention Gaining Support, Crim. Justice Newsletter, Nov. 21, 1983, at 3, col. l; Berg, Electronic Leashes Popular -
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bation," 35 forced charitable contributions, 36 chemical therapy, 37
forced birth control, 38 and even one recent case of court-ordered castration. 39 Shaming penalties thus are one strand of a larger movement
to expand the sentencer's arsenal of penalties.
Unlike these other punishment innovations, however, the shaming
sanctions are explicitly designed to make a public spectacle of the offender's conviction and punishment, and to trigger a negative, downward change in the offender's self-concept.40 Embarrassment and
consequent social isolation may result from any punishment; but with
most other sanctions shame and shunning are incidental and, some
would argue, undesirable consequences of the penalty. With shaming
penalties, in contrast, embarrassment is the principal purpose of the
punishment. In the following sections I describe several modern instances of formal attempts to shame offenders.

B. Signs
The most obvious illustrations of shaming are the sign sanctions.
Well-publicized41 examples of sign punishments are the convicted

But Effective?, L.A. Daily J., Aug. 14, 1987, at 5, col. 1; Federal Judge, Citing Costs of Prison,
Imposes ''House Arrest," Crim. Justice Newsletter, Oct. 1, 1985, at 2, col. 2; see generally Rush,
Deinstitutional Incapacitation: Home Detention in Pre-Trial and Post-Conviction Contexts, 13 N.
KY. L. REv. 375, 378 (1987). Home detention can be monitored by intensive human supervision
or by electronic surveillance through electronic monitors secured to the defendant's ankle or
wrist. Id. at 378.
35. Shock probation is the short-term incarceration of a first offender, intended to "scare her
straight" by showing her the harsh reality of penitentiary life. See generally Note, Shock Probation: An Alternative to Traditional Forms of Sentencing, 12 TEXAS TECH. L. REv. 697 (1981).
36. See, e.g., Liss, A Fine Way to Give to Charity, Natl. L.J., Nov. 26, 1984, at 47, col. I. See
generally Note, Charitable Contributions as a Condition of Federal Probation for Corporate Defendants: A Controversial Sanction Under New Law, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 530 (1985).
37. See, e.g., Demsky, The Use of Depo-Provera in the Treatment of Sex Offenders, 5 J,
LEGAL MED. 295 (1984) (discussing the compelled use of chemical hormone regulation with
convicted sex offenders).
38. See A Misconceived Ruling. L.A. Daily J., June 7, 1988, at 4, col. 1 (editorial).
39. See Goldfarb, Practice of Using Castration as Sentence Being Questioned, Crim. Justice
Newsletter, Feb. 15, 1984, at 3, col. 2 (reporting choice between castration or a 30-year sentence
that a South Carolina judge gave to three rapists). But see Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. Supp. 687
(D. Nev. 1918) (declaring unconstitutional a Nevada statute that authorized vasectomies for
certain sex offenders); Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), revd. on other grounds, 242
U.S. 468 (1917) (invalidating similar legislation in Iowa).
40. See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
41. See Nordheimer, In-House Dispute: Drunken Driver Bumper Sticker, N.Y. Times, June
6, 1985, at A22, col. 3; Scarlet Bumper: Humiliating Drunk Drivers, TIME, June 17, 1985, at 52.
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drunk driver bumper sticker42 and distinctive license plate.43 The convicted driver may continue to exercise driving privileges only if she
affixes the identifying sign to her vehicle.
Judge Titus, the Sarasota County Florida judge who initiated the
bumper sticker penalty in 1985, claims that after the program began,
drunk driving incidents dropped one third in the county.44 In explaining why she imposed the glow-in-the-dark sticker penalty, Judge Titus
said that tougher fines had failed to curb drunk driving. She noted
that "many people who are convicted of DUI as first offenders are well
adjusted in society. They hold good jobs and value their social standing .... The DUI sticker capitalized on [their] fear of public notice,"
by bringing "shame, disgrace and a ruined reputation."45
The state of Nevada recently adopted a statute that allows the
judge to order a defendant to perform forty-eight hours of work for
the community while dressed in clothing that identifies her as a DUI
offender.46 In a decision involving a defendant convicted under this
statute, the U.S. Supreme Court speculated that this penalty was "less
embarrassing and less onerous than six months in jail."47
Identifying signs have also been part of sentences imposed on sex
42. See, e.g., Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam),
appeal denied, 496 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1986). See generally Note, The Bumper Sticker: The Innovation That Failed, 22 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643 (1988) (discussing the legality and impact of the
bumper sticker penalty); Ohle & Wise, Stick Goes the Bumper, Natl. L.J., Dec. 28, 1981, at 35,
col. 2 (describing bumper sticker sanctions imposed by Washington state court judge).
43. See OHIO REV. CooE ANN. § 4503.231 (Page's 1988). The Ohio statute, which took
effect in 1986, reads as follows:
No motor vehicle registered in the name of a person whose certificate of registration and
identification license plates have been impounded •.. shall be operated or driven on any
highway in this state unless it displays identification license plates which are a different color
from those regularly issued and carry a special serial number that may be readily identified
by law enforcement officers.
The statute was applied in State v. Barbone, No. 3653, slip. op. (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 1987)
(requiring convicted drunk driver to display the different color plates pursuant to§ 4503.231).
44. Titus, ''Scarlet Letter" a Just Punishment (Council of State Governments publication)
(on file with author). Judge Titus reports that Sarasota County's DUI arrest rate dropped 33%
during January-June 1986 over the same period in 1985. She says nothing indicated that the
decline was due to decreased police patrols. Id.
45. Id. Judge Titus added that the sentence might also force alcoholics to acknowledge their
illness, and that the glow-in-the-dark sticker might aid law enforcement officers in apprehending
drivers who violated their driving restrictions. Id.
46. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484.3792 (l)(a)(2) (1987).
47. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 544 (1989). Justice Marshan wrote the
opinion. The issue before the Court was whether the defendant had a sixth amendment right to
trial by jury under the Nevada statute. The right does not attach for "petty offenses," which
usually means offenses for which the maximum imprisonment is six months or less. In observing
that the distinctive attire was less offensive than a six-month jail sentence, though, the Court
noted that the record failed to describe the clothing or where and when it had to be worn.
Blanton, 489 U.S. at 544 n.10.
The case raises an interesting question for "innovative sentencing" reforms: when is the alternative sanction penalty grave enough to trigger the jury trial right?

1888

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:1880

offenders. In one case, a repeat offender was required, as a condition
of probation, to post signs with letters at least three inches high on his
residence and vehicle doors that read: DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER - NO CHILDREN ALLOWED. 48 Other courts have required sex offenders to place ads in the local newspaper publicizing
their offenses, as in the Rhode Island case described above. 49
C. Apologies
A second type of shame sanction is the public apology or "confession." Judge Elaine Crane of Willoughby Municipal Court in Ohio
orders some first-time offenders to write a "confessional" letter to the
local newspaper. 50 In Tennessee, a judge ordered a defendant convicted of aiding in the sale of a stolen vehicle to confess his crime
before a church congregation. 51 In Newport, Oregon, a town of 8500
people, a convicted criminal may be ordered to write and pay for a
newspaper ad in which she announces the subject of her conviction
and apologizes to the community. 52 One man who opted for the public apology in lieu of a prison sentence stated that the cost of the social
embarrassment paled when compared to the cost of six months in
prison. 53
Another sanction closely related to the apology is compelled inter48. State v. Bateman, 95 Or. App. 456, 771 P.2d 314 (en bane), cert denied, 308 Or. 197, 777
P.2d 410 (1989); see also "Scarlet Letter" Sentence OK'd by Ore. Court, Natl. L.J., Nov. 23, 1987,
at 9, col. 4.
49. Hulick, supra note 1. The judge, Corinne P. Grande, reportedly imposed the sentence as
a condition of the offender's probation because "these cases aren't publicized" and "[t]here
doesn't appear to be sufficient social response to people like [the defendant]." Id. at Al4. She
added, "It seemed to me that [the defendant) ought to be made a public example." Id.; see also
Better than Prison, Peninsula Times Tribune, Jan. 4, 1990, at A9, col. 2 (picture of defendant
who agreed to wear for one year a T-shirt that read "My Record and Two Six Packs Equal Four
Years" on the front, and "I'm on Felony Probation" on the back instead of returning to prison);
Mintz, Judge Turns Confessing into a Religious Experience, Natl. L.J., Feb. 6, 1984, at 47, col. 2
(describing sanction requiring car thief to post five-by-four-foot sign in his yard announcing that
he was a thief).
50. See Enforcing the "Law" ofthe Letter, Natl. L.J., May 3, 1982, at 55, at col. 2. The judge
stated that the purpose of the sentence is to ask the defendant what she has learned and to
apologize to her victim. Id.
51. See Mintz, supra note 49, at 47; cf. Woman Ordered to Apologize to Man Falsely Accused
ofRape, Gainsville Sun, July 3, 1990, at 4A, col. 3 (describing an order of a Nebraska judge that
a woman who falsely accused a man of rape run radio and newspaper advertisements apologizing
to him).
52. See Mathews, Freedom Means Having to Say You're Sorry, Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1986, at
A3, col. 1. In this report, the district attorney and probation officer who initiated the program
explain that the idea " 'grew out of pure, sheer frustration.' " Id. They add that in a small town,
the publication would at least warn other citizens of the dangerousness of some offenders. A
local judge is reported to have said that he saw no problem with apology ads, as long as they were
part of a plea bargain and not an imposed sentence. Id.
53. Id. Some more recent media accounts have criticized the shaming punishment, however.
For example, a recent Newsweek article characterized apology advertisements as "a scarlet letter
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action between the defendant and her victims. For example, a defendant convicted of drunk driving may have to meet with people whose
lives have been adversely affected by drunk drivers. s4 The sentencer
who orders these face-to-face encounters may be motivated more by
the desire to promote consciousness-raising in the defendant or retributive satisfaction for the victims, however, than by the desire to shame
the offender. Still, the opportunity for victims to confront the defendant and to describe how her deed has injured them may well trigger
shame or guilt in the defendant, as well as satisfy the victims' expressive needs in some instances. ss
for the 1990s" and noted opponents' comparison of the practice to "public flogging." See Flogging?, supra note 12.
54. See, e.g., Egan, Pain Relived in War on Drunk Driving. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1989, at
Al6, col. 2 (describing a Redmond, Washington, program under which anyone convicted of
drunk driving must spend an hour with a victim's panel composed of people whose lives have
been changed adversely by drunk drivers). Forced interaction is also used as a sanction for
racially insensitive or abusive conduct on some college campuses. For example, the University of
Michigan adopted a controversial Policy on Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment by
Students in the University Environment, under which some students had been sentenced to write
apologies to the campus newspaper and to attend counseling or small group discussions. See
Hentoff, Watching What You Say on Campus, Wash. Post, Sept. 14, 1989, at A23, col. 3. The
policy was struck down as unconstitutional. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852
(E.D. Mich. 1989).
A different approach to victim satisfaction in a drunk driving case was fashioned by the
parties in a civil case in Virginia. The parents of a teenage girl killed by a drunk driver agreed to
settle the lawsuit for $936, but demanded that the teen defendant pay the amount $1 per week.
The parents insisted on the $1 weekly payments in order to remind the defendant weekly of what
he had done to their daughter. See Campbell, Parent Won't Let DUI Driver Forget, Gainesville
Sun, Mar. 31, 1990, at 2A, col. 5.
55. An apology is a sophisticated social gesture, as Goffman has observed. See E. GOFFMAN,
RELATIONS IN PUBLIC 113 (1971). He has described the apology as a device "through which an
individual splits himself into two parts, the part that is guilty of an offense and the part that
dissociates itself from the delict and affirms a belief in the offended rule." Id. According to
Goffman, an apology is a form of "ritual work," that may not compensate for the loss, but that
expresses a pious attitude toward the rule. Thus it is "a matter of indicating a relationship, not
compensating a loss." Id. at 118.
As Goffman has put it:
In its fullest form, the apology has several elements: expression of embarrassment and chagrin; clarification that one knows what conduct has been expected and sympathizes with the
application of negative sanction; verbal rejection, repudiation, and disavowal of the wrong
way of behaving along with vilification of the self that so behaved; espousal of the right way
and an avowal henceforth to pursue that course; performance of penance and the volunteering of restitution.
Id. at 113. Given this characteristic, apologies have a "one-time" effectiveness: if the offender
repeats the crime, then his apology is revealed to be insincere, and he has proven himself to be
more the self that committed the misdeed than the self that was originally embarrassed. Id. at
165-66. The "relationship" indicated by the apology thus is shown to be false.
The apology sanction seems to rest on the mistaken assumption that all victims will react
favorably to the offender's contribution. Different victims, though, will experience a crime differently. Not all victims want or need offender remorse, explanations, or confessions. See generally
Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937, 964-66 (1985) (discussing the
ways in which one-dimensional assumptions about victims' experiences can distort discussions of
criminal procedures designed to protect "victims' rights").
A victim's satisfaction in an apology often may be meager or none, depending on the crime
and on the victim. For example, a robbery victim may be far more satisfied if she reclaims the
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These modem penalties bear a strong resemblance to the pillory,
and other humiliatory sanctions of the American colonial period. The
obvious question is whether these sanctions make as much sense today, given our alternatives, as they arguably made in the seventeenth
century. In other words, does shaming deter crime, rehabilitate offenders, or serve any other legitimate punishment objective, given contemporary cultural conditions? If it is not likely to effect these ends,
then should the new sanctions be condemned as misguided spasms of
judicial and legislative pique?

III.

THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS

[T]heories of punishment are not theories in any normal sense. They are
not, as scientific theories are, assertions or contentions as to what is or
what is not the case . . . . On the contrary, those major positions concerning punishment which are called deterrent or retributive or reformative "theories" of punishment are moral claims as to what justifies the
practice of punishment - claims as to why, morally, it should or may be

used.56

A. Introduction
In any sensible and humane legal order, punishment should be rea-

sonably related to legitimate government ends. Thus, a preliminary
question is whether shaming may promote a valid government end. A
second, related concern is whether shaming is a humane and fair
means of achieving that end.
Classical penology identifies four ends of punishment of criminal
offenders: retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation. 57
Some authors have posited supplementary reasons for government-imposed punishment, such as that it satisfies and controls passion and
thereby promotes efficiency in norm enforcement, 58 or that it promotes a moral education. 59 Nevertheless, the classical justifications
loot from unrepentant criminals than if she receives an apology, but not money, from a truly
contrite one. E. GoFFMAN, supra, at 116. The effectiveness of an apology sanction, like that of
shaming sanctions in general, thus hinges on a number of psychological and social variables,
which may vary among crimes, victims, and perpetrators.
56. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY 72 (1968).
57. See generally M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES - LAW WITHOUT ORDER 106
(1972) (defining retribution, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence).
58. See, e.g., Ingber, A Dialectic: The Fulfillment and Decrease of Passion in Criminal Law,
28 RUTGERS L. REV. 861 (1975).
59. See, e.g., Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & Pun. AFP.
208 (1984); Introduction to CoNTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS AND JusTIFICATIONS 5 (R. Gerber & P. McAnary eds. 1972). The moral education theory seems to be
one form of rehabilitation, to the extent that it seeks to reform the criminal and encourage right·
thinking as a path to right-acting. It is also a form of deterrence, to the extent that the moral
"education" inherent in public punishment is directed both at the offender and the onlookers.
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still dominate philosophical debates about punishment. In the following sections, I describe briefly these classical justifications, and apply
them to modem shaming sanctions. I conclude that as a theoretical
matter, shaming may be justifiable under any of the classical theories
of punishment. I further conclude, however, that these four general
theories, taken together, offer abstract, theoretical justifications for
nearly any negative response to criminal behavior. Thus, the more
critical inquiries are whether the shaming penalties in fact will promote any of these theoretical ends, and whether shaming is a humane
way to achieve these ends.
B. Retribution

Retributivists argue that punishment is justified by the desire to
counteract or "compensate" for the harm inflicted by the wrongdoer.
It is, in short, retaliation against someone who "deserves it." "An eye
for an eye" is proper redress for a crime, in order to set right the moral
balance. 60 This focus is retrospective, and weighs only the value that
the offender has denied society.
Modem law construes crime as an offense against the state. 61 As
such, the harm to be redressed is the injury to society, and is measured
through its eyes. The damage to the victim is relevant only to the
extent that she is part of the larger society. Retribution thus is not
satisfied by victim compensation per se. Likewise, an individual victim's assessment of the harm inflicted is not dispositive.
Retributive justice is nonconsequentialist in that it is uninterested
in influencing the offender's future behavior or the behavior of other
community members. It presupposes free will by the criminal actor
The hope, I assume, is that they all will "learn something'' and avoid breaching these moral
lessons in the future. Punishment as "homily" might also satisfy retributivist ends if its delivery
makes victims feel more "whole." Thus the moral education theory is not a distinct justification
or theory of punishment. Rather, it is one tool for promoting norm enforcement. Cf. E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVlSION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 108-09 (G. Simpson trans. 1933) (describing the
goal of punishment as the affirmation of a co=on morality by expressing outrage at the breach
of the legaVsocial order).
60. See, e.g., H.LA. HART, supra note 56, at 233-35. But Hart also acknowledged that
different justifications for punishment become relevant at different points in a "morally acceptable account of punishment." Id. at 3. His definition of retributivism takes into account the
voluntary nature of the wrongful act· and whether the return of suffering to the offender is itself
just as good. Id. at 231.
Kant and Hegel are among the most prominent adherents to the view that the main justification of punishment is retribution, and that this is an end in and of itself. Some theology comports
with this view, though the reconciliation there is between a deity and man; it is not an earthbound exchange. See W. TSAO, RATIONAL APPROACH TO CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 7-8 (1955).
For example, retributive principles are expressed in Judea-Christian writings. Leviticus 24:17-22.
61. This construction has been the subject of mounting criticism, which has been described
as the "victim's rights" movement. For a description and critique of this movement, see Henderson, supra note 55, at 942-53.
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and demands a "proportional" negative response to her willful wrongdoing. 62 As such, the theory tends to ignore contextual or individual
complexities in favor of the criminal act itself. Retributive punishment thus is both an emotional expression of disgust and an exacting
of commensurate revenge that is meant to satisfy moral notions about
just deserts. Retributivists believe that what goes around should come
around (though they may disagree about why); the aim of punishment
is to see that it does come around.
The primary attraction of retributivism is that it has ancient roots,
and satisfies deep emotional, intuitive instincts. Moreover, its ends are
simply stated and seem fairly easy to secure. We punish in order to
avenge the harm, not to deter, rehabilitate, or contain. Revenge is
easier to accomplish than these other objectives.
In recent decades retributivists have gained adherents, 63 in part because of widespread skepticism about the rehabilitative or deterrence
effects of contemporary sanctions,64 and also because some people fear
the potential for abuse and the disproportionality of rehabilitationbased punishment schemes. Retribution has become an appealing alternative to these other less favored theories65 because it justifies punishment even when no deterrence or rehabilitation results.
Pure retributivist principles can justify the new shaming practices.
If, for example, a driver kills a young child in the course of operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated, forcing the driver to wear a sign in
public does promote retribution ends in a simple sense. The penalty
need not, under retribution theory, deter others or convince the defendant not to drive while drunk again. Its justification lies in the fact
that the defendant broke the law, and so "deserves" to be punished
regardless of any future effects of the punishment. If wearing a sign
62. Montesquieu, writing in the eighteenth century, emphasized proportionality as a necessary element of just punishment. Beccaria, writing in the same century, likewise stressed propor·
tionality. See W. TSAO, supra note 60, at 29-30.
63. See Berns, Retribution as a Ground for Punishment, in CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (F. Baumann & K. Jensen eds. 1989); Gardner, The Renaissance of
Retribution -An Examination ofDoing Justice, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 781; Henderson, supra note
55, at 945-48; Robinson, Moral Science, Social Science, and The Idea of Justice, in CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT: lssUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra, at 15; Rush, supra note 34, at 396 n.5. A
different, perhaps related approach - which emphasizes the victim as the focus of criminal law
- is the "restitutionary approach." This approach argues that restitution to victims, other injured parties, and society should be the purpose of punishment. See, e.g., C. ABEL & F. MARSH,
PUNISHMENT AND R.ESTrrurioN 12 (1984). Still another contemporary turn on retribution the·
ory is a recent article that develops a moral-emotive theory of punishment based on retributivist
assumptions. See Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment,
74 CoRNELL L. REv. 655 (1989).
64. Henderson, supra note 55, at 945-48.
65. The only other alternative to deterrence and rehabilitation is incapacitation, which poses
its own practical and moral difficulties. See infra section 111.E.
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exacts pain, then it is justified by the offender's past pain-inflicting
acts. Community outrage is expressed, and the moral calculus is set
right.
Of course, pure retributivism, and thus any retributivist- based attempt to justify signs, rests on fairly shallow reasoning, 66 namely, that
the law has to punish crime, however it can. Major objections to pure
retributivism, 67 which apply equally to retributivist justifications for
shaming, are that it does not prevent the abuses of unequal, disproportional, or inhumane punishment. 68
Even for a pure retributivist, however, the question remains
whether, in a particular community, wearing a sign or apologizing
would be perceived as a negative sanction, and thus would satisfy the
community's interest in revenge. I address this issue in a later section.
C. Rehabilitation
A second, also controversial, justification for punishment is rehabilitation of offenders. This theory is easily stated and understood:
the government punishes offenders in order to change their norm-violating ways. 69 Punishment therefore should promote specific deterrence ends, that is, deterrence of this particular offender. It may do so
through negative stimuli, so that the offender fears being punished
again and so avoids the behavior, or through training and opportuni66. "Retributivism" does not necessarily tell us when, or which, criminals "deserve it." Is
punishment triggered by a conviction? Only an "accurate" conviction? Only an accurate conviction for violation of a "good" law? Also, as Packer has explained, some retributivists believe that
the punishment is for the criminal's own good. It is a means by which she realizes her moral
character. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 38 (1968). Others argue
that it is for society's sake. Id. at 37-38. Pure retributivists, however, can argue it is for neither
the criminal nor society's sake, and ignore consequences altogether.
67. See, e.g., o.w. HOLMES, THE CoMMON LAW 45 (1881) (describing retribution as "only
vengeance in disguise"); J. BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 179-89
(1907) (implicitly rejecting retribution in favor of deterrence theory).
68. For example, retributivism presupposes that commensurability is a workable guidepost
for punishment. But what precisely does "an eye for an eye" mean? In what way, if at all, can
the sentencer ascertain the "proportionality" of a punishment for drunk driving or child molestation? "An eye for an eye" is one thing; a "sign for a molestation or human life" quite another.
The sign sanction may be too much, too different, or too little, depending on one's perspective, a
perspective one can justify only by entirely subjective, intuitive assessments of "equal harm."
A second problem lies in the pure retributivists' questionable assumption of free will. For
example, if a drunk driver is an alcoholic, is her moral culpability the same as a DUI offender
unaffiicted by this disease? Unless the preliminary, and highly problematic, assumption of free
will is irrebuttable, then individual factors like alcoholism pose tough complicating factors for
retribution theory in general and thus also for retributivist justifications of shaming. To ignore
these factors may result in disproportionate, unequal, and inhumane punishment. Yet, if one
admits some individual factors into the inquiry, then it becomes difficult to justify blanket exclusion of others, such as environmental or situational pressures that may make drinking and driving more or less the product of "free will." Problems of determinism and free will are
inescapable, unless one ignores them completely, which only pure retributivists are willing to do.
69. See F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 2-4 (1981).
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ties for reflection that actually change the defendanfs attitude as well
as her behavior.10
Rehabilitation theory gained popularity in the United States during the late 1800s, and dominated penal philosophy during most of the
1900s.71 Despite the initial promise of rehabilitation as a humane and
sensible organizing principle of punishment, however, its appeal
waned. 72 The central reason for this decline was that the practical
complexity, coupled with the extreme moral complexity, of refashioning human character to cabin or obliterate criminal instincts overwhelmed reformers. 7 3
Indeed, the rising doubts about whether rehabilitation is a convincing justification for punishment go deeper than skepticism about
whether prisons reform offenders. Some observers question whether
any feasible, humane punishment method can reform criminals. They
argue that the people most in need of "character reform" are most
impervious to it. Environmental, economic, biogenetic, psychological,
and other external and internal factors in place before and after the
rehabilitative intervention are, they claim, far more influential on offender character and behavior than any state-imposed intervention can
ever be.
Moreover, some critics observe, successful rehabilitation may be
difficult to assess. An offender can beguile her therapists, the parole
board, or others into believing that she has "really changed" this time,
and has powerful incentives to engage in such a charade. Measuring
rehabilitation of a human being thus can be as difficult as predicting
70. I include both reactions as evidence of rehabilitation, though pure rehabilitation anticipates the latter, complete character metamorphosis, whereas specific deterrence does not. Professor Blecker describes the distinction between pure rehabilitation and specific deterrence as
follows:
Specific deterrence and rehabilitation do overlap. Perhaps specific deterrence is a threat of
repeating a bad time inside [prison], whereas rehabilitation is a promise of a better time
outside. ...
Rehabilitation - or reformation - essentially consists in the acquisition of attitudes,
values, habits and skills by which an "enlightened" criminal comes to value himself as a
valid member of a society in which he can function productively and lawfully.
Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of Punishment Justified, 42
STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1197 (1990).
71. See F. ALLEN, supra note 69, at 5-7. Allen marks the decline of the rehabilitative ideal as
occurring in 1970s. Id.
72. See id. at 24-25 (describing critiques of rehabilitation theory).
73. See H. PACKER, supra note 66, at 55-58. For example, incarceration does not seem to
reform criminals, as its early advocates hoped it would. On the contrary, prison may congeal
criminal characters and teach inmates new norm- breaking skills, see, e.g., Blecker, supra note 70,
at 1192-202, or may even be an attractive setting to some few prisoners. See, e.g., Duncan,
"Cradled on the Sea:" Positive Images ofPrison and Theories of Punishment, 16 CALIF. L. R.Ev.
1201, 1219-30 (1988). Current recidivism rates also suggest that a rehabilitation justification for
imprisonment is implausible. Ex-prisoners simply are not forswearing crime in large numbers.
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her future dangerousness, which is difficult indeed. 1 4
Despite these and other criticisms of rehabilitation theory, a confirmed rehabilitationist could argue that experience proves only that
our past methods do not reform offenders, not that rehabilitation cannot ever work. Absent proof to the contrary, she might add, shaming
sanctions can be justified under rehabilitation theory. If, for example,
a particular offender were sufficiently pained by wearing a sign that
announced her status as a convicted felon, then she might be "scared
straight," and refrain from committing that offense in the future.
More obviously, if an offender is compelled to apologize to, or interact
with victims, then she might become sensitized to the human consequences of criminal acts. The experience might cause her to realize
more fully her responsibility to others and thus to avoid conduct that
could imperil them. Shaming therefore can be justified under rehabilitation theory, provided that the evidence, which is not yet available,
bears out that this "rehabilitation" in fact influences behavior. 75
In sum, rehabilitation theory arguably offers an analytically sound
defense of shaming practices. Because, however, rehabilitation theory
· anticipates offender reform, the rehabilitation-based justification for
shaming ultimately depends on whether a particular shame sanction in
fact will effect this consequence.7 6

D. Dete"ence
According to deterrence theory, the primary goal of punishment is
not to reform the offender or to cancel the moral debt of her crime; it
is to prevent future crimes.77 Deterrence theory holds that society in74. See, e.g., Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 97, 110 (1984)
(discussing the inaccuracy of clinical estimations of future dangerousness).
75. Less clear is whether exile-type sanctions would promote rehabilitation ends. The
message of banishment seems quite the opposite: you are beyond reform, and so must be expelled. For example, Aristotle wrote that "punishments and penalties should be imposed on
those who disobey and are of inferior nature, while the incurably bad should be completely banished." THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARlsTOTLE 271 (D. Ross trans. 1966) (emphasis added). The only conceivable rehabilitation-based justification for permanent exile would be that
the loss of social identity in one community might hurt enough to discourage the offender from
risking banishment from another. Thus banishment might be an attempt at "transcommunity"
rehabilitation. It seems very unlikely, however- at least to me- that those who banish offenders are acting out of rehabilitation instincts, or that banishment has reforming effects. Absent the
opportunity to and the formal means of rejoining the community post-banishment, the more
compelling justification for banishment is containment - that is, an attempt to protect the community from the offender by keeping her removed from them. For shaming sanctions, in contrast, rehabilitation-type justifications do make sense and may well be the reason that some
modern reformers favor these methods.
76. See infra section VI.C.
77. See generally J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 1 (1974); PANEL ON RESEARCH ON DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE EFFECTS, NATL. ACADEMY OF Ser., DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: EsnMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME
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flicts punishment on wrongdoers in order to deter the commission of
similar delicts by the same offender (specific deterrence) or by others
(general deterrence). Indeed, a significant number of philosophers insist that deterrence is the only legitimate end of punishment,78 provided that the punishment is not unreasonably harsh. Certainly,
deterrence figures prominently in most Westem theories of
punishment. 79
The primary objections to deterrence theory are practical ones,
though theoretical objections surely can be, and have been, made. 80
The common practical complaints are, first, that deterrence effects are
virtually impossible to gauge accurately, 81 and second, that the theory
wrongly presupposes that criminal acts are motivated by rational,
cost-benefit analyses by wrongdoers. 82 The theory also assumes that
RATES 4 (1978) [hereinafter DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION] (deterrent effects indicated
by an inverse relationship between sanction levels and crime rates). The philosophical foundation traditionally invoked in support of deterrence theory is utilitarianism. Punishment is regarded as an evil that contributes to the greatest good for the greatest number by preventing a
greater evil. See J. BENTHAM, supra note 67, at 171; H. PACKER, supra note 66, at 39.
78. c. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 75 (1953); J. BENTHAM, supra note 67, at
179-89.
79. Blecker, supra note 70, at 1173 (pointing out the roots of deterrence theory in Plato's
writings).
80. For example, some philosophers point out that if deterrence is one's sole theory of pun·
ishment, then one would not object to the punishment of an innocent person in order to deter
others. Also, if general deterrence is the only end, then we need not actually punish offenders;
apparent threats are sufficient. To a utilitarian, then, "real justice" is irrelevant, as long as others
are deterred.
81. For a discussion of the difficulties of assessing the deterrent effects of punishment, see
DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION, supra note 77, at 61-63.
82. See, e.g., J. ANDENAES, supra note 77, at 42-44 (describing critiques of deterrence theory
that question the assumption of rational behavior by potential offenders). In his historical account of capital punishment, G.R. Scott suggests that public punishments may not deter crime.
G. Scorr, THE HlsrORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1950). The following interview is of a
convict whose death sentence had been remitted, though he had been "within an ace of being
hanged for coining." Id. at 63.
Q: "Have you often seen an execution?"
A: "Yes, often."
Q: "Did not it frighten you?"
A: "No - why should it?
Q: "Did it not make you think that the same would happen to yourself?"
A: "Not a bit."
Q: "What did you think then?"
A: "Think? Why, I thought it was a - shame."
Q: "Now when you have been going to run a great risk of being caught and hanged, did
the thought never come into your head, that it would be as well to avoid the risk?"
A: "Never."
Q: "Not when you remembered having seen men hanged for the same thing?"
A: "Oh! I never remembered anything about it; and if I had, what difference would that
make. We must all take our chance. I never thought it would fall on me, and I don't
think it ever will."

Id.
Such anecdotes fuel our worst nightmares about crime. We prefer to think that most people
can, and do, imagine themselves "on the gallows," and that this possible scenario curbs law·
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sanctions can inspire fear in some, or most, onlookers. Different people, however, experience fear differently. The punishment thus must
be one that scares a significant number of would-be perpetrators. 83
The assumed causal link between threat and deterrence cannot be
verified without better knowledge than we currently possess, both
about the specific causes of norm-violating behavior, and about the
relation between deterrence and personality. In a well-known study of
deterrence, Zimring and Hawkins illustrate the byzantine complexity
of tracing the effect of legal threats84 on human behavior. For example, intuition probably suggests that a legal sanction would decrease
the attractiveness of the sanctioned conduct. In fact, however, a sanction can actually enhance the attractiveness of the proscribed conduct,
though this reaction may not be sustained. 85 That is, a sanction can
place both positive and negative value on an activity, and "no general
statement can be made about which pull will be stronger." 86 Empirical proof of the assumptions on which deterrence theory rests therefore depends on extremely complex assessments of human motivation
breaking instincts. That is, shame sanctions, like legal threats in general, presuppose a positive
correlation between negative penalties for a behavior and avoidance of it. But the prospect of
shame may not necessarily provide avoidance. Whether and to what extent it does hinge on
multiple, contradictory theories about criminal personality and about subcultures of deviance.
Sigmund Freud, for one, believed that criminals committed bad acts in order to be caught
and punished. He theorized that unresolved, unconscious guilt and anxiety lead offenders to
commit the acts and be punished. S. FREUD, THE EGo AND THE ID (1961). That is, whatever
motivates nondeviant members of society to conform to established norms may not motivate
deviants. If Freud was correct, then adding to or "piling on" more stigma to conviction penalties
may not deter a larger population than already is deterred by the prospect of conviction and
punishment. Those who are susceptible to this sort oflegal threat tend to obey the laws anyway.
Those who do not obey laws are unlikely to be deterred more by the additional stigmatizing effect
of public shame than by conviction and conventional punishments. The key to controlling this
group might be increasing their perceived chances of getting caught - though according to
Freud, even certain apprehension would not deter some offenders, because they may want to be
caught.
Other commentators likewise present a psychological portrait of criminal subcultures that
undermines strong deterrence claims for shame sanctions. Reporting on this work, one article
notes that some theorists describe the offender as someone who "does not experience real guilt or
shame concerning bis crimes . . • • Indeed, the successful offender is described as triumphant •••.
[The] criminal is always self-confident and never thinks of bis actions as being morally wrong."
Frazier & Meisenbelder, Exploratory Notes on Criminality and Emotional Ambivalence, 8 QUALITATIVE Soc. 266, 268 (1985) (describing the work of Yocbelson and Samenow).
Likely a more accurate profile, however, is that most criminals believe not that their acts are
morally correct, but that they are in some way emotionally satisfying, justified, or "thrilling." Id.
at 271. To most offenders, then, doing wrong is not intrinsically good, but it may seem worth it.

w.

83. See
TSAO, supra note 60, at 58-59; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 245-48
(1973).
84. Zimring and Hawkins coined the phrase "legal threat." See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 83, at 91-92.
85. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 83, at 94-96; see also J. KATZ, SEDUCTIONS
OF CRIME: THE MORAL AND SENSUAL ATTRACTION OF DOING EVIL (1988).
86. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 83, at 96.
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and behavior. Given these complexities, the deterrence literature is
equivocal and not at all susceptible to simple summaries.
Deterrence theorists do agree, however, that strong socialization is
a significant predictor of law-abiding behavior. AB Zimring and Hawkins observe, "social disapproval, which is an important part of most
threatened consequences, will be carefully avoided by the strongly socialized individual." 87 Thus, legal threats are most likely to be effective in constraining the behavior of strongly socialized people, who
already tend not to engage in criminal behavior. Many deterrence theorists also believe, despite the lack of absolute empirical proof, both
that legal threats impose at least some constraint on deviant behavior,
and that legal threats' best justification lies in this desirable effect. 88
A deterrence theorist likely would conclude that, as a theoretical
matter, shaming sanctions probably are justifiable. Signs and apologies - like any other negative consequence of a criminal conviction might deter the specific offender or other would-be offenders from
committing similar acts. 89 And, like all penalties, shaming sanctions
should deter most effectively those people who are most strongly socialized. This means, of course, that the population most vulnerable
to humiliatory punishments probably includes mainly, if not only,
those people who least need them as an incentive to avoid wrongdoing.
But a deterrence theorist might respond that this merely indicates that
shaming sanctions may be redundant deterrence tools; it does not
mean that deterrence ends cannot justify these sanctions.
Deterrence of future wrongdoing thus may be an adequate justification for the new shaming sanctions. Indeed, the judges and legislators who have proposed shaming sanctions probably believe quite
87. Id. at 120. Gerber and McAnary have made a similar point, concluding as follows:
The prevention of crime as a goal of society is not ultimately achieved by either crass fear or
huge detention centers but by a successful communication of disapproval. It is n moral
process which depends for its success on a widely accepted system oflaw which reflect[s] n
consensus of values and embod[ies] a fairness in procedure that guarantees equality of
enforcement.
Introduction to CoNTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS,
supra note 59, at 5.
88. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 83, at 93; see also J. ANDENAES, supra note
77, at 16-29; Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions, 67 MICH. L. REV. 421, 452-53
(1969). This belief is weakened by data that tend to show that existing sanctions, especially
incarceration, are not significant deterrents of criminal behavior. See, e.g., DETERRENCE AND
INCAPACITATION, supra note 77, at 37-42, 59-63.
89. Whether banishment is meant to serve even general deterrence ends, however, is questionable. Again, the more likely purpose is containment, not deterrence. But the threat of expulsion surely would frighten community members who value community acceptance. See Liggio,
The Transportation of Criminals: A Brief Political-Economic History, in AssESSING THE CRIMI·
NAL: REsrrruTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 273, 281-83 (R. Barnett & J.
Hagel eds. 1977).
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strongly that the threat of social ostracism will deter people from committing similar crimes. As was true of rehabilitation theory, however,
deterrence theory is consequentialist; as such, a complete justification
of shaming based on deterrence theory must consider whether the assumed deterrence consequences of these new sanctions actually occur.
The critical inquiry for deterrence theorists thus becomes whether
shaming in fact will prevent future crimes. 90
E. Incapacitation
The final classical justification for shaming sanctions is incapacitation. Incapacitation theory holds that punishment should protect the
community from the offender, either by confining her physically, or
otherwise disabling her from committing future crimes.91 An incapacitationist favors external controls on an offender with demonstrated criminal propensities, rather than relying on the offender's
capacity for self-control. Imprisonment, banishment, home electronic
surveillance, branding, mutilation, chemical treatment, and castration
all are examples of incapacitative punishments.92 Each seeks either to
physically remove the offender from society, or to make criminal acts
substantially more difficult to perform.
Incapacitation theory has at least two significant weaknesses. The
first is that it assumes that we can predict which criminals pose an
ongoing risk of harm. Incapacitationists often rely on past criminal
activity, demographic factors, or other variables as strong predictors
of future criminal activity. If these variables do not yield accurate
predictions, however, then some offenders will be punished who do
not, in an incapacitationist's sense, "deserve" it. The second weakness, according to some observers, is that the theory is too forgiving of
some offenders. Incapacitationists believe that offenders who pose no
future risk to the community should not be punished, though they
may have committed quite serious criminal acts. For example, "heat
of passion" murderers, or other criminals who act on situation-specific
or person-specific impulses and are unlikely to commit future transgressions, can be released if they pose little or no danger to others. To
retributivists in particular, this is an unacceptable response to a serious
injury.
Despite these potential shortcomings, incapacitation theory offers
support to the shaming sanctions. Public apologies, confessions, or
90. See infra section VI.B.
91. See, e.g., H. PACKER, supra note 66, at 48-53.
92. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
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signs may well be incapacitative, in that they might make future criminal acts more difficult for the offender to perform. Publicizing the offender's identity may alert community members of her criminal past
and cause them to isolate her socially or professionally. People might,
for example, refuse a convicted embezzler a position that gives her
access to funds. A known child molester may be denied contact with
children. And a convicted drunk driver may be refused alcohol or a
job that involves use of a vehicle. As such, the shaming sanctions may
have a disabling effect on the offenders, and thus may claim to serve
incapacitation-type ends.

F. Conclusion
The traditional theories of punishment suggest that all of the new
shaming sanctions can be justified under one or several of the basic
theories. Indeed, any and all forms of punishment that our contemporary legal order might concoct likely would be consistent with at least
one of these four capacious and controversial theories.
In the United States, no one theory clearly dominates all criminal
punishment practices in a coherent, comprehensive way. Rather, justifications that courts and legislatures offer for punishment practices
seem to reflect a pluralistic theory of punishment. As such, the political acceptability of any punishment technique, including shame sanctions, will depend on whether the evidence indicates that it actually
promotes any of the four classical ends of punishment, rather than on
whether it promotes a particular end. That is, does the new shaming
in fact deter, rehabilitate, or incapacitate criminals, or exact proportional revenge for crime? And, if it does promote any of these ends in
fact, is this shaming a reasonably humane way to further these ends?
In the remaining sections, I explore both the likely practical effectiveness and the humaneness of shaming.
IV.

THE EMOTION OF "SHAME"

Were they ashamed when they had committed abomination? Nay, they
were not at all ashamed, neither could they blush.93

In order to evaluate both the practical effectiveness and the humaneness of a shaming sanction, one first must define the phenomenon
of shame and identify the conditions under which it occurs. The key
sources of this definition and the conditions of shame are psychological and anthropological materials.
Psychological studies demonstr~te the complexity and gravity of
93. Jeremiah 6:15.
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the shame emotion, and the extreme difficulty that judges are likely to
experience if they attempt to craft sanctions that match offender-specific definitions of shame. Psychologists describe shame94 as a highly
individual experience that strikes at the center of human personality.
The emotion evoked is a feeling, a "kind of fear of dishonor ... [that]
produces an effect similar to that produced by fear of danger." 95 This
feeling is triggered by tension between an individual's ego ideal and
her conscious or unconscious awareness of the ego's actual potential.96
Shame forces a downward redefinition of oneself, and causes the
shamed person to feel transformed into something less than her prior,
idealized image. 97 Wurmser describes the reaction as follows:
In shame one feels frozen, immovable, paralyzed, even turned into stone
or into another creature, such as an ass or a pig (not only in jokes, but in
dreams, delusions, and myths as well); contempt by another has succeeded in changing the human partner into a mere thing, into a nothing.... The loss of love in shame can be described as a radical decrease
of respect for the subject as a person with his own dignity; it is a disregard for his having a self in its own right and with its own prestige. . ..
The thrust of this aggression is to dehumanize. 98
This dehumanization and social demotion typically occur only
when a shameful trait or act becomes visible, and is exposed to
others. 99 Thus, one condition of the shame emotion is an audience.
As one writer has said, "Shame is essentially public; if no one else
94. The dictionary defines shame as "a painful emotion caused by consciousness of guilt,
shortcoming, or impropriety in one's own behavior or in the behavior or position of [another]."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2086 (1986).
95. THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISrOTLE, supra note 75, at 104-05.
96. See, e.g., G. PIERS & M. SINGER, SHAME AND GUILT 28-29 (1971). The psychological
theories that elaborate on shame are fairly recent. Freud and Jung dealt only briefly with the
emotion of shame in their celebrated works. See generally Hultberg, Shame - A Hidden Emotion, 33 J. ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY 109, 111-13 (1988) (offering a brief historical survey on
the treatment of shame in in-depth psychology). Anthropologists, not psychologists, have emphasized the role of shame in their studies. See id. at 113-15.
97. G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96, at 26-27.
98. L. WURMSER, THE MAsK OF SHAME 81 (1981) (emphasis added); see also Hultberg,
supra note 96, at 116.
99. c. SCHNEIDER, SHAME, EXPOSURE AND PRIVACY 34-35 (1977); see also E. ERIKSON,
CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 252 (2d ed. 1963) (describing the exposure and visibility inherent in
shame).
Psychologists have attempted to distinguish "guilt" from "shame." See, e.g., A. Buss, SELFCoNSCIOUSNESS AND SOCIAL ANxlETY 157, 159-61 (1980) ("Shame is a fear of abandonment;
guilt is a fear of castration."); H. LYND, ON SHAME AND THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 34-36, 50,
64 (1958); s. MILLER, THE SHAME EXPERIENCE 140-43 (1985) (distinguishing shame from guilt
on basis that shame involves attention to a defect in a specific self-image, whereas guilt involves
attention to one's actions, not one's self-image); L. WURMSER, supra note 98, at 80-82 (concluding that shame sanctions use contempt as the punishment; guilt sanctions use anger and hatred);
Frazier & Meisenhelder, supra note 82, at 274-80 (contrasting guilt and shame on basis of
whether the emotion is based on internal (guilt) or external (shame) controls).
Some anthropologists have relied on these distinctions to categorize certain cultures as
"shame" or "guilt" cultures, depending on whether they rely on external or internal sanctions.

1902

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:1880

knows, there is no basis for shame. And if your action is seen, you can
diminish shame only by running from the group." 100 Shaming requires witnesses who will learn of the shameful act and who will condemn it.
The audience to a shaming must include people who are important
to the offender, 101 or she will not be "ashamed." The anxiety that
shaming exploits is a fear of abandonment or isolation, usually from a
social group or other community that is necessary or valuable to the
individual. 102 The individual fears that, given the revelation of her
shameful act and transformation into a lesser self, people will disregard or abandon her. Abandonment or isolation from a group is anxiety-producing only for an individual who shares the values of the
community or at least fears exposure before them. To be effective, the
public rebuke therefore must threaten a significant relationship. 103
Goffman describes shame as a dynamic social exchange in which
an individual "loses face" or becomes "shamefaced." 104 As he defines
it, face is "the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. "105 Face is lost
when information is brought forth in some way about his social worth
See G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96 at 59-61 (describing and reformulating these distinctions).
In legal discourse, happily, these fine-tuned psychological distinctions between guilt (internal)
and shame (external) may be overlooked. As other commentators have observed, criminal law
theorists need only concern themselves with whether public opinion plays some role in character
formation and behavior. See J. BRAITiiWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION 57
(1989); Note, A Perspective on Non-Legal Social Controls: The Sanctions of Shame and Guilt in
Representative Cultural Settings, 35 IND. L.J. 196, 199-204, 206 (1959). They need not decide
whether negative public opinion evokes "shame" versus the closely related phenomenon of
"guilt." Consequently, I use the term "shame" throughout, but mean it to include the guilt
emotion wherever guilt would likewise be produced by public shaming.
100. A. Buss, supra note 99, at 159; cf. H. LYND, supra note 99, at 27-28 (concluding that
"[t]he exposure may be to others but, whether others are or are not involved, it is always •••
exposure to one's own eyes"); G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96, at 66-68 (observing that the
audience need not be actual for a person to experience shame; it can be fantasized).
101. A. Buss, supra note 99, at 160.
102. See, e.g., G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96, at 29 ("Behind the feeling of shame
stands not the fear of hatred, but the fear of contempt which, on an even deeper level of the
unconscious, spells fear of abandonment, the death by emotional starvation."); H. LYND, supra
note 99, at 67; Hultberg, supra note 96, at 115-16 (Shame "is the fear of being excluded from
human society. Shame implies fear of total abandonment. It is not a fear of physical death, but
of psychic extinction."). As Goffman has observed, an individual may violate some social expectation or norm, yet be "untouched by this failure," when the individual is sufficiently alienated
from the censuring group. He is "protected by identity beliefs of his own, he feels that he is a
full-fledged normal human being, and that we are the ones who are not quite human." E.
GoFFMAN, STIGMA 6 (1963).
103. C. SCHNEIDER, supra note 99, at 36.
104. E. GOFFMAN, On Face-Work, in INTERACTION RrruAL 5, 8-9 (1967).
105. Id. at 5.

June 1991]

Shame

1903

which cannot be integrated ... into the line that is being sustained for
him.... [He is] out offace when he participates in a contact with others
without having ready a line of the kind participants in such situations are
expected to take. 106

In other words, shame requires a social encounter, an interaction between an individual and the group that exposes weaknesses or deficiencies in the individual and that reduces her post-shaming social
standing or compromises her own idealized prior image.
Other psychologists likewise stress the social dynamics of shaming.
John Braithwaite, who has written extensively on shame and punishment, has noted that "[w]hereas an actual punishment will only be
administered by one person or a limited number of criminal justice
officials, the shaming associated with punishment may involve almost
all of the members of a community." 107 This means that the /relevant
audience must experience and must communicate a roughly common
sense of outrage at, or contempt for, the sanctioned member's actions.
If all or most of them ignore the spectacle, it loses its sting. This audience participation often includes withdrawal from the offender. Public
shaming in many instances is followed by community shunning. Indeed, shaming exploits one's fear of shunning by others, or banishment
from the community.10s
106. Id. at 8; see also E. ERIKSON, supra note 99, at 406 (describing the infantile roots of
shame and the fear of "loss of face before all-surrounding, mocking audiences").
107. J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 73.
108. Exile of an offender may occur in one of two ways. The community may be ordered to,
or elect to, avoid the offender socially or otherwise; or, the court or other community official may
take steps to secure her physical or other isolation from the community even absent community
cooperation. The first type of exile is shunning; the second is banishment. Banishment typically
is reserved for the most egregious cases, where the offender must be expelled altogether from the
community or some part thereof. The banishment may be temporary, like a limited-term sentence, or permanent, like lawyer disbarment.
Banishment represents the ultimate downward manipulation of social identity of an offender.
In effect, the local identity is erased, eradicated. The shunning is complete and permanent. The
defendant must effect new contacts elsewhere, and begin a job and life in another community.
Shunning is a less severe punishment, at least to the extent that the individual remains in the
community and may have the opportunity to regain her neighbor's approval.
Shunning and banishment of an offender can serve several functions. First (and likely foremost) is the protection of the community from the exiled one. Second is the deterrence of similar
acts by other remaining members of the community. A third possible function is to prevent
retaliation by some members of the community toward the offender, and divisive factionalization
of the group.
Effective shunning practices, like effective shaming, require audience participation. The audience must be willing to assume not only the role of approving spectator, but also that of active
disciplinarian. The penalty's effectiveness depends upon the community's willingness to endorse
the sentence by avoiding the wrongdoer. Audience complicity of this sort may be secured in
several ways. Community withdrawal from a wrongdoer is particularly likely to occur in a community with powerful social and normative cohesion, like the Amish or the gypsies. But it may
also occur in a community that punishes its members, formally or informally, if they fail to
cooperate in shunning the offender. This may occur in authoritarian regimes that can inspire
sufficient fear in its people to secure their cooperation.
Of course, the members of all communities may shun an offender because they fear harm
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CULTURAL CONTEXT

The modem cry in Westem countries for community alternatives to the
established systems of crime control is a belated need for simpler solutions to crime than repression by helicopters, electronics, computerization of records, and armed policemen. Unfortunately, the
"communities" referred to are often not in existence so that despite the
awareness, such lessons are difficult to learn from the advanced urban
complexes. 109

A. Introduction

In addition to the individual-specific psychological meaning of
shame is a culture-specific 110 or anthropological meaning that influences the effectiveness of a shaming sanction. Because shaming involves audience participation or shunning of the offender or both,
cultural patterns and norms of behavior partly determine whether the
audience will participate in the ritual. Also, to the extent that social
conformity is achieved through a shared sense of shame and guilt, 111
these emotions necessarily have community- or culture-dependent
meanings. There is, in other words, a "cultural ego ideal." 112 For
example, if a culture idealizes work as a means of accomplishment,
from the offender. For example, an employer may be disinclined to hire a convicted thief out of
fear of her propensity to commit similar bad acts, such as embezzlement. Formalized shunning
and banishment rituals nevertheless are more characteristic of close-bound, distinctive communities, than of impersonal, less distinctive cultures.
109. W. CLIFFORD, CRIME CoNTROL IN JAPAN 17S (1976).
110. Words like "culture," "community," or "society" have elusive meanings. Goffman captures this slipperiness in the following passage:
To say that a particular practice is formed in a given place (or a given class of places) leaves
a great deal unspecified even when systematically collected data are available. For it is often
unclear whether it is claimed that the practice occurs throughout the place or only somewhere in it, and if throughout, whether this is the only place it occurs. Furthermore, [some]
social arrangements and small behaviors .•. have the awkward property of pertaining not to
a set of individuals that can be bounded nicely, like the citizens of a particular nation state,
but to groupings whose boundaries we know very little about.•.• In any case, the reference
unit "American Society" (which I use throughout), is something of a conceptual scandal,
very nearly a contradiction in terms; the social unit "civilization" (whatever that might
mean) is as relevant as that of nation state.
E. GoFFMAN, supra note SS, at xiv-xv.
The dangers of obscuring contextual complexities by invoking broad-brush terms like "culture" are massive. Everything that ethnographers say in general about a people or social group
may be wrong in practical, particular applications. These errors may be compounded when cultural generalizations are plucked from their original anthropological context and applied to new,
foreign settings, like criminal law theory. Nevertheless, generalizations may offer useful organizing outlines of significant tendencies in human relations. Goffman himself assumes this, insofar
as he relies on the reference units of "society" and "Western society" despite his misgivings
about these words.
111. See G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96, at S3-SS (describing the role of shame and
guilt in socialization of the individual).
112. Cf. id. at 91 (calling it a cultural "super ego" in reliance on Sigmund Freud's works); H.
LYND, supra note 99, at 28 ("The particular aspects of the self especially vulnerable to exposure
differ in different cultures.").
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then a beggar in that culture "'ought to be ashamed.' " 113 Indeed,
these cultural meanings may be inescapable. 114 Finally, if the purpose
of official shaming is to deter members of the community from committing similar acts, then the judge must be able to ascertain and exploit this shared sense of shame.
Measurements of the cultural ego ideal, like those of the individual
ego ideal, are difficult to perform115 given the number and complex
interaction of variables that give rise to shame. Moreover, the cultural
meaning of shame varies widely across national cultures and within
pluralistic, national cultures. Further compounding any attempt to
describe a cultural meaning of shame is that anthropologists disagree
about which cultural variables most influence a particular culture's
definition of shame. For example, some researchers have identified
childrearing practices as the primary variable that affects both cultural
and individual meanings of shame. 11 6 Others argue, however, that a
focus on childrearing alone undervalues other relevant cultural variables, which may include the society's "beliefs and values, contact and
conflict with other cultures, and the historical development of particular institutions in a particular geographical environment.'' 117 Regardless of whether any one factor is dominant, the studies confirm that a
host of cultural factors can influence which parts of the self will be
especially vulnerable to public exposure. 118 One's susceptibility to the
sort of moral criticism that "shaming" implies thus depends both on
cultural variables 119 and on the individual experiences already
113. G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96, at 54-55; see also Kaufman & Raphael, Shame:
A Perspective on Jewish Identity, J. PSYCHOLOGY & JUDAISM, Spring 1987, at 30, 34 (describing
sources of shame in contemporary American society, such as failure to succeed, unpopularity,
and failure to be independent); Myers, Emotions and the Self: A Theory ofPersonhood and Political Order Among Pintupi Aborigines, 7 ETHOS 343, 349 (1979) (describing the cultural understandings that may give rise to an emotion - such as shame - or to a sense of its
appropriateness).
114. As Piers has observed, "[m]any a Utopian writer has tried to project a society which is
cohesive without fear of guilt-creating punishment and without shame-producing competition.
No attempt at realization has succeeded so far." G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96, at 55.
115. Id. at 83-84. Moreover, these difficulties "are greatly multiplied when the measurements have to be standardized for different cultures." Id. at 83.
116. See, e.g., F. ELKIN & G. HANDEL, THE CHILD AND SOCIETY: THE PROCESS OF SOCIALIZATION 63 (4th ed. 1984).
117. G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96, at 89.
118. See H. LYND, supra note 99, at 28. For example, in some cultures death by decapitation
was viewed as more honorable than death by hanging. In China, however, severance of the head
from the body was considered a disgraceful death. See G. Scorr, supra note 82, at 167.
119. Here again, though, I offer a caveat. The anthropological studies may overemphasize or
misinterpret the significance of shaming among cultures that are foreign to the anthropologist
observer. For example, although some studies of North American Indian tribes suggest that
sharp differences exist between the tribal groups and white groups, other investigators have concluded otherwise. See G. PIERS & M. SINGER, supra note 96, at 76-78. Moreover, there is a
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mentioned.
In the following sections, I describe several cultures in which official shaming is, or was, a particularly forceful and common means of
enforcing norms. The shared characteristics of these cultures lend insight into the cultural conditions under which shaming may be a
meaningful, effective, and humane sanction. In general, these cultures
are ones that seem to possess a reasonably coherent, and widely acknowledged, cultural meaning of shame, which officials or community
leaders can fairly readily exploit to secure adherence to cultural rules.
B. Pre-World War II Japan -

A Paradigmatic Shame Culture

Anthropologists have identified as shame cultures120 ones in which
tendency to homogenize the practices of the various tribes, and to deemphasize or distort the
differences among them. Id. at 76-77.
120. As indicated in note 99, supra, anthropologists once commonly invoked a conceptual
model that distinguishes between guilt cultures and shame cultures. See generally Hultberg,
supra note 96, at 113. The model has been summarized as follows:
[T]he individual in a guilt culture develops a conscience with firm ideas of right and wrong,
and, in consequence, submits to certain ethical and moral principles. A guilt culture is one
in which authority is based on concepts like transgression and punishment, sin but also
forgiveness, eternal salvation but also eternal damnation, a punishing God but also a
merciful God. In a shame culture the highest goal is not a clear conscience but a good
reputation among people•••• In such societies, ridicule is often the hardest punishment
which can be inflicted on a individual.
Id. Applying this model, some anthropologists have identified as shame cultures certain Eskimo
societies, see, e.g., R. Lowra, PRIMITIVE SOCIETY 413 (1920) (discussing the song duels em·
ployed to mock offenders), early Greek culture, see, e.g., E. DODDS, THE GREEKS AND nm
IRRATIONAL 17-18 (1951); J. REDFIELD, NATURE AND CuLTURE IN TIIE ILIAD 115-19 (1975),
pre-World War II Japanese culture, see text accompanying notes 121-46 infra, and some North
American Indian tribes' cultures, see, e.g.• K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY
260-61 (1941) (describing use of satire as form of social control among the Cheyenne); G. PET·
TIT, PRIMITIVE EDUCATION IN NORTH AMERICA 60-62 (1946) (describing the use by some
American Indian tribes of opprobrious or ridiculous nicknames to encourage the young Native
Americans to observe the tribal code of proper behavior).
Some of these anthropologists rank guilt cultures and shame cultures hierarchically, with
guilt cultures given more elevated status. Hultberg, supra note 96, at 114. As Hultberg has
observed, however, this ordering may stem from the relative neglect of shame by psychologists,
and from the linking of "shame" to certain (disfavored) types of society. Id. Post-reformation
bourgeois culture, he notes, had strong connections to Protestantism and Puritanism, and thus
focused more on "guilt" than "shame." Id. The ability to feel guilt, and the absolute distinction
between right and wrong, were essential to "[keep] people rooted in bourgeois culture, by obliging them to render account to society for themselves and for their deeds." Id. Bias toward
bourgeois culture norms thus may explain these anthropologists' notion that guilt cultures are
"more advanced" than shame cultures. In any event, their dubious hierarchical claim is not
critical to their descriptive claims.
One of the anthropologists' descriptive claims is that the decline of Christianity in Western
European and American cultures and thus of Christian notions of good and evil, may signal a
shift in these cultures from "guilt" to "shame" sanctions. If consensus about good and evil
erodes, then authority that is based on the "guilt" concepts of "sin," "transgression," or "for·
giveness" loses its force. Nevertheless, shame sanctions cannot provide a suitable replacement
for guilt sanctions unless social consensus of a different sort emerges. This consensus need not be
about good and evil, but about "face" and the conditions of favorable social standing.
As a practical legal matter, however, the anthropological distinctions between shame cultures
and guilt cultures make little difference. In both cultures, broad social consensus is an essential
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the members make frequent and conscious use of shaming as a means
of behavior control. Perhaps the best known, or most often invoked,
example of a shame culture is that of pre-World War II Japan.
In 1946, cultural anthropologist Ruth Benedict published a now
well-known study on Japanese society. 121 Her theme was of particular
interest to American readers of the day, as they had just fought a war
in which understanding the Japanese psyche and cultural traditions
became important. 122 Benedict concluded that shame was "the root of
virtue" 123 for the Japanese people prior to World War II. Their strong
concern about social judgment, 124 and the likelihood that in this close
society with relatively little privacy, misconduct would not go unnoticed,125 caused Japanese citizens to conform closely to social expectations. Moreover, if a Japanese person's social standing were attacked,
she could not count on her family to rally behind her; the family's
support was contingent on support from the larger community.126 As
Benedict observes, this is an extraordinary cultural response. In most
societies, the family group will protect a member under attack. Thus,
the significance of outside approval to the Japanese was comparatively
high.
aspect of effective legal authority. This consensus may emphasize "sin" in a guilt culture,
whereas it may stress "honor" in a shame culture, but both require broad community cohesiveness. Moreover, public shaming may be effective in either culture. One may feel guilt, yet also
value social approval, so that public revelation of a transgression could trigger both shame and
guilt.
Of course, an offender who feels guilt or remorse may not need public "spanking'' to feel
punished, whereas a remorseless offender might. Thus, under an individualist scheme of punishment, shaming sanctions might be warranted less often in a guilt culture than in a shame culture.
But unless a society depends solely on offender remorse as an instrument of social control - as
few modern nation-states do - and uses no public method of punishment, then shame and social
embarrassment are implicit aspects of its punishment scheme. Thus, any culture or social group
that relies on public processes to determine guilt and punish offenders can plausibly be characterized as a "shame culture" in one sense. Meaningful sorting among cultures therefore turns not
on whether its members value social approval, but on the extent to which they value it, and the
extent to which they exploit that vulnerability to enforce social norms.
121. R. BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD (1946).
122. Benedict's data were not gleaned from personal visits to Japan, but from others' writings about the Japanese, from Japanese films, and from her discussions with Japan-born persons
living in the United Sates. Id. at 5-8. Despite this methodological deficiency, her work has been
influential in anthropological studies of Japanese culture.
123. Id. at 224.
124. Id. Benedict's theory has been criticized for focusing only on "public shame" and ignoring "private shame" in Japanese culture. "Public shame" would not be triggered by praise;
"private shame" might be. The Japanese word "haji" extends to both types of shame, which in
English might be called embarrassment (private shame) and shame (public shame). The Japanese are highly sensitive to embarrassment-haji, (or exposure sensitivity), which makes them
exceptionally vulnerable to shame-haji. See Lebra, Shame and Guilt: A Psychocultural View of
the Japanese Self. 11 ETHOS 192, 194 (1983) (relying on work by Sakuta).
125. See infra text accompanying note 139.
126. See R. BENEDICT, supra note 121, at 273-74.
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This deference to external estimations of one's value was inculcated during childhood. Mothers would teach their children to know
shame, upon threat of the drastic sanction of withdrawal of family
affection. 127 These early childhood experiences provided "rich soil for
the fear of ridicule and of ostracism which is so marked in the Japanese grown-up." 128 Elders would attempt to protect their children
from the pain of future shame by schooling them in their obligations
to the world, and teaching them that failure to meet those obligations
would, in later life, be greeted with ridicule. The Japanese child therefore was taught social etiquette, recognition of and subordination to
her duties to her neighbors, family, and community, and strong selfdiscipline. 129
The Japanese pattern of childhood training, and the values on
which it was premised, help place into perspective the deep importance of one's name in Japan, and the particular seriousness of an insult to a Japanese male's name. Vengeance and even suicide may have
been necessary to remove the stain in some situations. 13° For example,
if professional commitments were not met, this would bring shame to
one's name. 131 This acute sensitivity to insult and to dishonor to one's
name also explains some Japanese etiquette. A Japanese person would
take great care to avoid telling another person to his face that he had
made a professional error, 132 and to avoid any other shame-causing
situation that would call into question another's "girl to his name" 133
that is, the obligation to live according to one's station in life. 134
Public rebuke of an individual reared under these cultural conditions surely would strike deep and hard. Shame sanctions in Japan
during this period therefore likely proved a significant deterrent to voluntary, socially disapproved behavior. On an informal level, the fear
of shame produced conformity. On a formal legal level, this fear could
127. Id. at 286-87. Through teasing, the mother would cajole the child into socially correct
behavior. For example, if a child were noisy or disobedient, the mother might say to a visitor,
"'Will you take this child away? We don't want it.' " Whereupon the visitor would take the
child and begin to carry it outside the house. Id. at 262. The child would become frightened,
and promise to be good. When the mother was convinced that the child had learned the lesson,
she would relent. Id.
128. Id. at 263.
129. Id. at 272-73.
130. Id. at 145.
131. These standards were set quite high. Thus Benedict reports that school principals committed suicide because fires at their schools threatened the Emperor's picture - even though the
fires were not the principals' fault. Id. at 151.
132. Id. at 152-53.
133. Id. at 156.
134. Id. at 149.
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be reinforced and further manipulated through the publicity of offenses and of punishment. Moreover, the structured and tight-knit nature of Japanese society would have assured widespread agreement
about the terms of social approval, an essential condition of effective
shaming and shunning.
Contemporary studies of crime in Japan suggest that these informal shaming sanctions continue to work. The fear of shame, and the
attendant loss of social status, help to explain the low crime rate in
Japan. 135 As one commentator has said, "If crime is the price of freedom, then ... it is a price the Japanese are not willing to pay." 136 The
Japanese observe the restraints on freedom that these social expectations impose, in part because they can only escape them by leaving
Japan or by living a life separate from the social structure, which is an
extremely lonely life in Japan.1 37 Once an individual "opts" out of the
structure by refusing to conform, it is extremely difficult to reenter,
because seniority is given great value. The prodigal must begin anew
at the bottom. 138
There is also little chance that a breach of the social compact will
go unnoticed. 139 The Japanese today continue to live in close physical
proximity, and are subject to an informal sort of "surveillance," insofar as people take an interest in each other's doings. Deviant conduct
is difficult to hide.1 40
Taken together, these anthropological insights demonstrate the relationship between effective social, informal policing, and governmental enforcement of rules of behavior. Japan can rely to a significant
extent on nongovernmental measures to control deviant behavior because the Japanese culture observes, and has in place informal instruments to enforce, fairly clear and coherent cultural standards. 141
135. See W. CLIFFORD, supra note 109, at 8-9. But see supra text accompanying note 81,
regarding the tenuous nature of speculations about causation with crime control measures.
136. W. CLIFFORD, supra note 109, at 8.
137. Id. at 8-9.
138. Id. Clifford notes:
each one in Japan has a recognized position to fill in the scheme of things, and he is expected
to live up to it. The Japanese society is so constructed that if he does live up to it, then he
will benefit; if he does not live up to it, then he will be despised and bring shame on all those
connected with him. And if he should choose to break out of the system, to become a freelancer, to live as a gypsy or to be unconventional in some way, then he is free to do so, but
he can expect to have a very difficult time - all the more difficult if he tries to get back into
the system later.
Id. at 10.
139. See supra text accompanying note 125.
140. W. CLIFFORD, supra note 109, at 13-14.
141. Id. at 8-11; see also Lebra, supra note 124, at 192-93. This is not meant to suggest that
the modem Japanese all share a common faith or uniform set of values. In fact they embrace a
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Given the Japanese emphasis on social responsibilities and on subordination to one's role within that social structure, some formal punishments that are effective in Japan fit poorly, if at all, into other
cultures' punishment schemes. For example, for some crimes, Japanese prisoners are given the option of volunteering for a one-week exercise of intensive self-observation, in which the prisoner is isolated
except for visits by a teacher or sensei. 142 The object of the seclusion
and instruction is to encourage the prisoner "to see his own personality in its relation with others as a function of those relationships." 143
The prisoner is encouraged to blame himself for his complaints, and to
recognize his debt to his family.144
This emphasis on the individual's relationship to the community is
both striking and significant. The community, in turn, reinforces and
rewards obedience to social duty. Thus, while manipulation of one's
fear of shame may seem a harsh tool for assuring obedience, the individual receives positive affirmation in exchange for her compliance.
Moreover, this punishment scheme is not wholly unforgiving; it allows
for reacceptance of a contrite offender. As John Braithwaite has put
it, Japan shames "reintegratively." 145 By "follow[ing] shaming ceremonies with ceremonies of repentance and reacceptance . . . [t]he
moral order derives a very special kind of credibility when even he
who has breached it openly comes out and affirms the evil of the
breach." 146 Thus, the stakes are high when one defies the moral order,
but total social banishment is a rare consequence: the offender may
humble himself and thereby be reintegrated into the social fabric.
diffusion of values. Nevertheless, the Japanese, prompted by tradition and habit, tend to con·
tinue to meet the expectations of those around them. W. CLIFFORD, supra note 109, at 177-78.
142. W. CLIFFORD, supra note 109, at 94.
143. Id.
144. Id. Contrast this method and underlying theory with imprisonment in the United
States and the underlying religious thinking during the early nineteenth century. Prisoners
would be confined to their cells and given only a Bible to read. They might receive religious
instruction from ministers or lay persons. See S. WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE 74 (1980). The
methodology was inspired by Matthew 25:36: "I was in prison and ye came unto me." S.
WALKER, supra, at 73. Today the prisoner might also, or instead, receive psychotherapy or
counseling as a resocialization mechanism. Yet the ends of this psychotherapy differ from those
of Japanese psychotherapy. Lebra describes the Japanese therapeutic method of Naikan, in
which the client, under the guidance of a counselor, reflects in isolation on his faults in relation to
the people most important to him, especially his mother. Lebra, supra note 124, at 205. Even in
psychotherapy, the Japanese individual's obligation to her community and family is stressed to a
degree unmatched in most American cultures.
Lebra emphasizes that Japan is not only a shame culture in Benedict's sense, but also a guilt
culture. Id. at 193. Again, the nearly inextricable nature of the emotions of guilt and shame
make distinctions between them hazy, if not chimerical.
145. J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 74.

146. Id.
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C. Shaming Rituals in Other Cultures

Though Japan offers a paradigmatic instance of a shame culture,
many cultures likewise achieve significant social control and norm observation through shaming techniques. Lowie reported during the
early 1900s that various Eskimo tribes relied on public embarrassment
as a response to crimes against tribe members. 147 Although the various Eskimo settlements were separate societies with little political cohesion among them, within each settlement the Eskimo tribe was
strongly cohesive. Thus the tribe could rely on the informal adjustment of grievances, rather than on a central governing agency.148 One
such informal Eskimo adjustment technique was the "song duel."149
The duels were ways of sanctioning various behaviors, such as infidelity, destruction of property, and theft, among others.1 5o The victim of
the misdeed would compose a satirical song to mock the perpetrator
and then challenge him to a public song duel. 151 Lowie describes the
duel as follows:
Drumming and chanting, [the challenger] throws his enemy's misdeeds
into his teeth, exaggerating and deriding them and even rattling the family skeletons as well. The accused person receives the mockery with
feigned composure and at the close of the challenger's charge returns in
kind . . . . The spectators follow proceedings with the greatest interest,
egging on the performers to their utmost efforts. 152

Using these song duels, the Eskimos sought to preserve the social order without violence or other formal coercion.
A somewhat similar custom - the vito - historically was observed by villages in southern Spain. 153 The villagers would visit an
offender's house at night and make a great noise and yell abusive
songs. This annoyance could become so bothersome that the culprit
would eventually decide to leave the area, thereby effecting a sort of
constructive banishment. 154 Indeed, the fear of being mocked in public operates as a powerful sanction in most Mediterranean cultures,
given the important role of honor and shame to Mediterranean
147. See R. LoWIE, supra note 120, at 412-15.
148. Id. at 413.
149. Id.; see generally A. RADc:LIFFE-BRoWN, STRUCTURE AND FuNCTioN IN PRIMmVE
SOCIETY 205-11 (1952) (describing range of negative sanctions used by various cultures to
achieve obedience to norms, from organized to diffuse, and from formal legal to informal social).
150. R. Low1E, supra note 120, at 413.
151. Rasmussen, Observations on the Intellectual Culture of the Caribou Eskimos, in VII
REPORT OF THE FIFTH THULE EXPEDffiON No. 2, at 73 (1930).
152. R. LoWIE, supra note 120, at 413.
153. See J. BEATIIE, OrnER CuLTURES 172 (1964).
154. Id.
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people. 155
The use of satire as a sanction also has appeared among Tobriand
Islanders, where the injured party would shout out his accusations and
derision from within his house, at night, so that all of the villagers
could hear the charges. The accused one might feel compelled to leave
the village, unless he was certain of his innocence or rights in the matter. The shame of being accused even caused some villagers to commit
suicide. 156

D. Shaming in White Colonial America
The white colonists of the United States inflicted on wrongdoers a
host of punishments that bear a striking resemblance to the new shaming tools. In a tum of the century account, 157 A.M. Earle describes
the colonists as "vastly touchy and resentful about being called opprobrious or bantering names; often running petulantly to the court about
it and seeking redress by prosecution of the offender." 158 This ultrasensitivity, she remarks, enhanced the effectiveness of the shaming
sanctions. 159 Moreover, the social intimacy of colonial communities
meant that criminal offenders typically were known members of the
group, not transient outsiders. 160 Thus, the fear of disgrace before the
community was considerable.161
One colonial shaming sanction, the admonition, was administered
as follows:
Faced with a community member who had committed a serious offense,
the magistrates or clergymen would lecture him privately to elicit his
repentance and a resolution to reform. The offender would then be
brought into open court for a formal admonition by the magistrate, a
public confession of wrongdoing, and a pronouncement of sentence,
wholly or partially suspended to symbolize the community's
forgiveness. 162

The admonition was a "go and sin no more" lecture, which was fol155. Id.
156. Id. at 176 (relying on work by :Malinowski); see also A. EPSTEIN, THE EXPERIENCE OP
SHAME IN MELANESIA 12-13 (1984).
157. A. EARLE, CURIOUS PUNISHMENTS OF BYGONE DAYS (1896).
158. Id. at 1.
159. Id. at 2.
160. Hirsch, From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration in Early Massachusetts, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1223-24 (1982).
161. At least one historian reports, however, that the humiliatory punishments were rarely
imposed on social elites. Instead, these offenders were ordered to pay a fine. See E. POWERS,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MAssACHUSETl'S 195 (1966).
162. Hirsch, supra note 160, at 1224; see also E. POWERS, supra note 161, at 197, 202-04
(describing public confessions).
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lowed by a public apology or confession. The practice has been documented in seventeenth-century Virginia, where it involved both church
and state. The offender often was forced to confess publicly to her
congregation, 163 sometimes dressed in a white cloth, 164 and beg their
forgiveness. 165 This forgiveness, or redemption, effectively drew the
offender back into the fold and further reinforced the moral order.
The forced wearing of signs or letters that listed one's offense also
occurred throughout the colonies. 166 In early Maryland, offenders
were compelled to stand in the pillory wearing a sign listing their
crimes. 167 Permanent labeling, through branding the offender, was another colonial method of punishing criminals.16s
The victims of permanent labeling practices in the colonies included a vast range of offenders. 169 The temporary forms of labeling
- wearing signs or initials - differed from the permanent labeling of
branding or maiming in that the former punishment was intended to
elicit shame but in a reintegrative fashion. Branding and maiming, in
contrast, were permanent stigmas, which in effect cast the person out
of the community, though they did not involve physical banishment.170 Branding and maiming also were designed in part to prevent
the offender from committing future similar acts, 171 either by warning
future victims of their criminal propensities or by disabling the
offender.
Other colonial forms of humiliation punishment included the
"bilbo" - a bar of iron with two sliding shackles, like handcuffs, into
163. A. EARLE, supra note 157, at 20, 35-36.
164. Id. at 111-13.
165. One account of punishment methods in Maryland during the late 1600s reports that a
man "was forced to stand in open court 'with a paper on his breast declaring his offence [sic].' "
R. SEMMES, supra note 4, at 39. In another case, a husband and wife were required to kneel
before the county justices and ask for forgiveness. The justices in the case explained that they
required the married couple to kneel before them because the couple had no other way to make
satisfaction. Id. at 39.
166. A prominent literary example of the role of such shaming appears in N. HAWTHORNE,
THE SCARLET LETIER (1850).
167. R. SEMMES, supra note 4, at 32; see also E. POWERS, supra note 161, at 198-201
(describing signs and symbols of early Massachusetts); Hirsch, supra note 160, at 1226 (describing wearing of signs as punishment in early Massachusetts).
168. R. SEMMES, supra note 4, at 35. The colonists, however, were not the originators of the
labeling custom. The practice dates at least from the twelfth century. See A. EARLE, supra note
157, at 94.
169. Some Quakers were branded or maimed for practicing their faith. A. EARLE, supra
note 157, at 138-42. Other offenders who were marked with signs or initials were drunkards, see
id. at 88, cheats, see id. at 53-54, slanderers, see R. SEMMES, supra note 4, at 40, hog stealers,
murderers, thieves, and runaway slaves, see id. at 35.
170. Hirsch, supra note 160, at 1228.
171. Id.
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which the prisoner's legs were locked. 172 Earle describes the use of the
bilbo sentence in seventeenth-century Massachusetts, where, for example, one "Jams Woodward" was sentenced to be "'sett [sic] in the
bilbowes for being drunk at Newetowne.' " 173 And, of course, there
was the pillory, the humiliating character of which was sometimes
compounded by forcing the offender not only to be sent there, but to
go with dough on his head 174 or with cabbages on his head,175 or with
other symbols of his particular offense. The crowd then might seal the
prisoner's mortification by throwing stale eggs at him.116
The ducking stool, which was used in particular for "scolding women, "177 the stocks, 178 and the pillory all were customary features of
the colonial county courthouses. Jails were uncommon before the late
160Qs.179

The white colonists thus earned their reputation for severity in
dealing with offenders. 180 Puritan culture, especially the belief in the
doctrine of predestination, may help to explain the seemingly unfeeling tone, and the specific methods, of Puritan punishment. 18 1 The Puritans understood deviant behavior to be a mark of a person whose
fixed, evil nature was becoming manifest. Their deep fear of evil and
desire to reinforce the strict moral order of the community led them to
emphasize formal public apologies and confessions because they believed that these public expressions of guilt and remorse would reinforce the moral order. Moreover, even if the criminal were
condemned to death, the officials sought her confession before the exe172. A. EARLE, supra note 157, at 3-4.
173. Id. at 5.
174. Id. at 51 (describing the punishment of a dishonest baker).
175. Id. (describing the punishment of a person who had stolen cabbages).
176. Id. at 52.
177. Id. at 11, 17 (noting that the sentence was designed to "silence idle tongues").
178. Id. at 29. The stocks were regarded as low class, so that gentlemen were not sentenced
to the stocks. The pillory was "aristocratic in comparison ••••" Id. at 35.
179. R SEMMES, supra note 4, at 34-35. The absence of formal prisons, however, did not
mean that defendants were never physically confined. For example, Cuthbert Fenwik, "a prominent Maryland colonist," once was confined to a house that became the "prison" of St. Mary's
County, but was allowed to venture to within one-half mile of the house. Id. at 32.
Public whippings also were a common form of punishment, and were often shockingly brutal.
K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS 188 (1966). Like the stocks, however, this punishment was
not inflicted on "gentlemen." R SEMMES, supra note 4, at 38-39; see supra note 178.
180. Still, punishment elsewhere in the world - then and now - was and is in many ways
more severe. One commentator speculates that the reason the Puritans' methods nevertheless
seem exceptionally harsh is that they were delivered in "cold righteousness," with a "relentless
kind of certainty" that paid scant attention to offender motives, victim grief, community anger or
any other emotion. K. ERIKSON, supra note 179, at 189. Erikson reasons that Puritan justice
had a "flat, mechanical tone because it dealt with the laws of nature rather than the decisions of
men." Id.
181. See id. at 194-95.
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cution. The condemned person in effect would stand aside from her
own life and misdeeds, pronounce them the work of the devil, and
join, figuratively speaking, the crowd that affirmed the correctness of
her execution. 182 This cooperation in, or "consent" to, the penalty
may have relieved somewhat the Puritans' underlying discomfort,
however buried, in punishing an offender whose sins were believed to
be beyond her power to prevent.
Puritans' indoctrination into the will of God and the laws of nature, as the Puritans perceived them, began in childhood. 183 During
the early months of life, the infant was treated indulgently. Shortly
thereafter, a radical shift occurred toward a harsh, disciplined life. 184
The object was to curb or beat down the child's wilfulness as soon as
possible in a direct confrontation with "original sin." 185 The effect, in
psychological terms, was to deprive the child of a confident sense of
autonomy. 186 As psychologists have observed, "the reverse of autonomy is the distress created by deep inner trends of shame and
doubt." 187 Thus, the Puritan child became an adult who was extremely sensitive to public exposure and shame. 18 8
The Puritan punishment practices, like those of the Japanese and
other cultures already described, demonstrate the connection between
a community's normative structure and the nature and effectiveness of
legal sanctions. The colonial shaming practices can only be understood in light of the community's religious beliefs, childrearing techniques, and other culture-specific features. Like the Japanese, the
Eskimo tribes, and the Tobriand Islanders, the white colonists lived in
intimate, closely bound, and normatively cohesive communities,
within which shaming could and did play a signal role in reinforcing
standards of behavior.
182. Id. at 195 (''The victim [was] asked to endorse the action of the court and to share in the
judgment against him, to move back into the community as a witness to his own execution."); see
also supra text accompanying note 55. This emphasis on cooperation by the criminal was not
unique to the Puritans. During the 1700s in Amsterdam, the authorities likewise encouraged
penitence of criminals, such that "[t]he execution of a disbeliever was not a perfect one." P.
SPIERENBURG, supra note 8, at 59.
183. See, e.g., Demos, Developmental Perspectives on the History of Childhood, 2 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY. HlsT. 315, 320-21 (1971).
184. Id. at 321.
185. Id. at 320-21.
186. Id. at 321.
187. Id. at 323.
188. Id. at 324. The Puritans' sensitivity to public shame is reflected in the large number of
defamation actions they filed, as well as in the range ofhumiliatory punishments they employed.
Id. at 325.
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E. Conclusion
The effectiveness of shaming sanctions, whether formal or informal, hinges on a variety of cultural conditions. Informal sanctions
appear to work best within relatively bounded, close-knit communities, whose members "don't mind their own business" and who rely on
each other.1s9 These cultures have widely shared moral or behavioral
expectations of their citizens, which are publicly expressed. 19° High
expectations of social responsibility, coupled with close social bonding,
a deemphasis of personal autonomy, and strong family attachment,
produce conditions that are conducive to reintegrative shaming. 191 Effective shaming also entails a strong identification between the shamed
offender and other members of the community.192
These cultural factors help to explain why shaming as a form of
social control occurs more often within small societies that are characterized by intimate face-to-face associations, interdependence, and cooperation.193 Close relations of this type often are missing from
modem urban settings. 194 The gravity of humiliatory punishments to
an individual also will hinge on her relative power and resources. If
she must depend greatly on the group for social, economic, or political
support, or cannot leave the group easily, then a social sanction will
have a tremendous impact. 195 Thus, those people who are most likely
to defy social norms and risk shaming sanctions, even within closeknit societies, are the very rich and the very poor. The rich can afford
to defy the norms because they are insulated by their wealth. The
189. J. BRAl11IWAITE, supra note 99, at 8.
190. Id. at 10; see also Schwartz, Social Factors in the Development ofLegal Control: A Case
Study of Two Israeli Settlements, 63 YALE L.J. 471, 483 (1954).
191. J. BRAl11IWAITE, supra note 99, at 30.
192. Schwartz, supra note 190, at 483.
193. Id. at 477 (quoting c. CooLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 23 (1909)); see also Merry,
Rethinking Gossip and Scandal in 1 TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CoNTROL:
FuNDAMENTALS 271, (D. Black ed. 1984).
194. When, however, urban conditions create tight-knit social pockets or neighborhoods
with equivalent "economic and social interdependence and barriers to mobility outside the com·
munity," then informal social sanctions in the form of gossip may be powerful curbs on social
behavior. See Merry, supra note 193, at 289-90. The potential adverse consequences of shaming
within these pockets are the same as in other small-scale societies, including ostracism, shunning,
ridicule, and banishment. Id. at 284-86.
195. Id. at 282, 286; see also Grimes & Turk, Labeling in Context, in CRIME, LAW, AND
SANCTIONS: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 34, 55 (M. Krohn & R. Akers eds. 1978) (noting that
"[t]he effect of labeling upon self-definition depends upon the relative power of each involved
individual, as each impinges upon the others in the course of the highly personal enterprise of
self-definition"); cf. Jensen & Erickson, The Social Meaning ofSanctions, in id. at 119, 133 (con·
cluding that "those subjects who attribute stigmatic consequences to official labels are least likely
to engage in behavior which is liable to labeling. Those most likely to deviate are those for whom
official labeling may be socially meaningless.").
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poor may defy the norms simply because they cannot afford to conform, and because they have less "social standing" to lose. 19 6
The final factor that seems to contribute to effective shaming is the
culture's capacity and instinct for reinforcement of socially co"ect behavior. In intimate societies, the organs of authority often deliver both
praise and rebuke. They also have established rituals for reclaiming
the shamed one, should she prove herself worthy.
VI.

APPLICATION

A. Introduction
In the following sections, I apply the foregoing psychological and
anthropological materials to modem American criminal law enforcement, and speculate about whether shaming is likely to yield positive
social benefits. I focus in particular on whether shaming will deter
crime, insofar as I regard this as the main objective of those who favor
shame sanctions.
First, I raise doubts about a court's ability to identify the individual meaning of shame, as is necessary to effect specific deterrence or
rehabilitation ends. The complex nature of shame, and the practical
limitations on a judge's time and inclination to make accurate estimations about an offender's ego ideal, suggest that customized shame
sanctions are an impractical objective.
Second, I note that in most criminal court contexts, especially
those in large urban centers, the cultural conditions of effective, humane shaming seem absent. Unlike the intimate face-to-face cultures
that rely heavily on shaming, cities in the United States typically are
not characterized by high interdependence among citizens, strong
norm cohesiveness, or robust communitarianism. Moreover, the primary conditions to effective shaming - audience awareness and participation, a cohesive body of would-be offenders who perceive and are
sensitive to the same shame, judicial personnel and procedures that
can tailor sanctions to the target audience sensitivities, and a formal
means of reinte,grating shamed offenders - seem only weakly present
in these settings. This suggests that even sanctions that are intended
to exploit a community-specific, versus offender-specific, definition of
shame likewise are unlikely to effect significant deterrence.
Third, I list several institutional, administrative, and other practical problems with shaming that may make it unworkable. Fourth, I
invoke the historical decline of shaming as a warning against its revi196. Merry, supra note 193, at 283-84.
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val. Finally, I describe a context in which many people imagine that
shaming would prove exceptionally effective - middle-class crime. I
suggest that even as applied to this status sensitive population, shaming may not add measurably to the deterrence value of existing
sanctions.
These conclusions are subject to an obvious and important caveat.
No empirical work currently is available with which to test the practical impact of shaming sanctions. What follow, therefore, are provisional hypotheses.
B. Shaming and Offender-Specific Factors

The signal insight from the psychological studies of shame is that
the experience is personal. People are reared differently and exposed
to different peer relationships and other personality shaping influences;
as such, they experience shame differently. 197 Psychologists offer general statements about one's ego ideal, but these merely describe how
life experiences tend to shape the ego ideal, rather than what, precisely, those events include. For example, they believe shame hinges
on the extent to which a person has a confident sense of her autonomy.
They do not know, however, how to assure this confidence or how to
ascertain which adults lack this training and hence are exceptionally
prone to shame. For a judge in a criminal case to take into account
the multiple, individual meanings of shame thus would be difficult
indeed.198
A second, practical implication of the psychological work on
shame likewise suggests that shaming may not have impressive specific
deterrence or rehabilitative effects. The people who are most vulnerable to shaming are the ones who are most strongly socialized. 199 This
means that the people most likely to respond to public shaming sanctions are nonoffender members of the audience, not potential offenders. An offender has demonstrated her imperviousness to the relative
cost of public shaming by committing the act in question. Unless she
is the first person to suffer the public humiliation, or otherwise has no
warning that her actions might trigger public shame, she apparently
was not deterred, for whatever reasons, by the prospect of shaming.
Of course, she may have imagined, unreasonably or not, that she
197. See supra text accompanying notes 94-108.
198. See infra Part VII.
199. See supra text accompanying note 103; cf. Jensen & Erickson, supra note 195, at 133.
Lawrence Friedman once ironically remarked that, "Criminals, it was commonly observed, did
not blush." L. FRIEDMAN, A HlsrORY OF AMERICAN LAW 601 (2d ed. 1985). In fact, however,
psychological studies on shame suggest otherwise, though offenders may blush at different things
than nonoll'enders.
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would evade detection. In any event, the threat of a possible conviction and shaming best deters the people who most fear social disapproval, who usually are not offenders.200
On the contrary, public degradation ceremonies may reduce inhibitions that tend to cabin criminal instincts, according to some theorists.
The anticipated effect of public shaming is a downward change in status, coupled with symbolic and actual shunning of the offender by
others.201 Indeed, this shunning of convicted offenders may' occur
even when public officials try to contain it.202 Once the offender's status is changed, though, she may have a reduced incentive to avoid the
behaviors that triggered the demotion. 203 This is especially true when,
as is the case in modem American criminal courts, there is no public
ritual, ceremony, or other procedure for reestablishing or regaining the
lost status. Modem shaming, like modem punishment in general, is
not "reintegrative." The stigmatized offender thus may "drift" toward
subcultures that are more accepting of her particular norm violations. 204 Association with the subculture in tum may facilitate future
crime, especially for crimes that require multiple actors or hard-toobtain materials, tools, or connections.
Labeling theorists believe that these potential negative consequences of stigmatizing offenders outweigh any benefits. Specifically,
they argue that by labeling an offender "deviant" - which shaming
sanctions clearly try to do - the state may produce "secondary deviance," or criminal acts that are a result of the labeling.205 Critics of
200. See Jensen & Erickson, supra note 195, at 133. The authors conclude that
those subjects who attribute stigmatic consequences to official labels are least likely to engage in behavior which is liable to labeling. Those most likely to deviate are those for whom
official labeling may be socially meaningless. Thus, those most likely to be labeled may be
the least likely to be affected by labeling. • • • To understand the variable consequences of
labeling requires an understanding of the social meaning of sanctions.
Id.
201. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 83, at 191; J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99,
at 60.
202. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 83, at 191.
203. Id. at 193. If, however, the stigmatized offender cannot locate or gain the acceptance of
a subculture that tolerates her stigma, then she may adopt a life of solitary deviance, or try to
regain admission into the dominant culture. J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 68. For some
crimes, such as drug offenses, solitary deviance may be impossible. A drug offender needs, at the
least, a supplier or a buyer. Id. at 67.
204. See D. MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFr (1964).
205. See generally R. TROJANOWICZ & M. MORASH, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: CoNCEPTS
AND CoNTROL 59-61 (4th ed. 1987); Gove, The Labelling Perspective: An Overview, in THE
LABELLING OF DEVIANCE 9 (W. Gove 2d ed. 1980); Mahoney, The Effect of Labeling Upon
Youths in the Juvenile Justice System: A Review of the Evidence, 8 LAW & SocY. REv. 583, 58485 (1974); see also J. FREEDMAN & A. DOOB, DEVIANCY: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING DIFFERENT (1968) (describing influence on experimental groups of public disclosure of their "deviance" from "average" scores on a "personality" test. Those identified as deviants first sought to
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labeling theory, such as Walter Gove, quite sensibly have responded
that no empirical data prove that the secondary deviance is a result of
the labeling, versus whatever conditions or instincts prompted the primary offense.206 These critics further maintain that good results can
flow from labeling, such as isolating the offender and thereby preventing corruption of others (incapacitation), deterring other potential
deviants (general deterrence), forcing the offender out of a criminal
lifestyle, and, perhaps, channeling her toward appropriate rehabilitative services (specific deterrence and rehabilitation). 201
The strength of these last claims I will address below. The evidence on the first claim, that labeling or stigmatizing an offender may
increase the chances of subsequent delinquent behavior, is inconclusive. The most accurate statement is that we do not know, for certain,
whether labeling produces secondary deviance. If the labeling theorists are correct, however, then shaming not only may not promote
specific deterrence or rehabilitative ends, it may defeat them. Moreover, the more effective the shaming, the more counterproductive it
may become. The judge thus would need to predict both the offender's individual susceptibility to shame and her likely post-shaming
behavior. Each factor in turn might vary with the nature of the offense, the nature of the shaming sanction, and pre- and post-conviction environmental, and other offender-specific conditions. With some
crimes, there is little doubt that some offenders feel sincere shame, but
do not stop their behavior. Some spouse abusers, for example, may
experience acute remorse after a beating episode, yet repeat the
beatings. 208
A final implication of the psychological aspects of shame, which
raises both practical and fairness concerns, is the nature of the wound
that shaming seeks to inflict. When it works, it redefines a person in a
negative, often irreversible, way. Effective shame sanctions strike at
an offender's psychological core. To allow government officials to
search for and manipulate this vulnerable core is worrisome, to say the
least. Moreover, nothing in the psychological materials on shame, or
in the available literature on the stigmatic aspect of punishment, indiconceal their deviancy. Once it was disclosed, however, they chose to associate with other "deviant" subjects).
206. Gove, supra note 205, at 13-15 (collecting empirical work); see also Mahoney, supra
note 205, at 588-89; Wellford, Labeling Theory and Criminology: An Assessment, 22 Soc. PRODS.
332 (1975).
207. Gove, supra note 205, at 18.
208. See, e.g., L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 65-66 (1979). But see J. FLEMING,
STOPPING WIFE ABUSE 289 (1979) (noting that not all men express regret after a beating
episode).
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cates that a judge or any other person can reconstruct that core after
the defendant has "done her time" in the "public stocks." Certainly,
nothing in contemporary criminal punishment practices suggests that
judges have adopted procedures for rebuilding this core.

C. Shaming and Modem Cultural Patterns
Anthropological and historical materials are especially pertinent to
estimations of the general deterrence effects of shunning and shame.
The signal insight of these materials is that for shaming to be an effective method of controlling community behavior, the community in
question must be receptive to these methods. This receptivity depends
on whether the community satisfies the several cultural and institutional conditions that have been identified as characteristics of socalled shame cultures.
The cultural conditions of effective shaming seem weakly present,
at best, in many contemporary American cities. Indeed, shaming
sanctions run counter to the pattern of existing methods of norm enforcement in the United States. First, most law enforcement is conducted outside of public view. Private security officers, employers, or
other nonpublic agents play a significant, nonpublic role in norm enforcement.209 Even when public agents do enforce punishment, however, it rarely comes to the attention of the rest of the community in
any systematic, high-profile manner. 210 Millions of people are arrested
and convicted each year, but only a handful excite significant national
or local interest or attention.
Formal shaming thus would constitute a significant change in law
enforcement: it would attempt to bring to public attention a wide
spectrum of criminal case dispositions. This shift, however, would require a dramatic restructuring of existing practice and procedure and
a reversal of the strong trend toward privatization of criminal punishment. The question is whether such a reversal is likely to produce
substantial public benefits.
The most thoughtful argument in favor of deprivatizing criminal
law has come from John Braithwaite. Braithwaite insists that public
shaming would improve the effectiveness of criminal law enforcement
because it would help to create a shared, moral conception of order.
209. See J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 60-61.
210. In fact, most criminal cases do not reach the trial stage. The overwhelming majority are
plea bargained and thus escape public scrutiny. See generally Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's
Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea
Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50 (1968); Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining,
76 CoLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976); Vorenburg, Decent Restraint ofProsecutorial Power, 94 HARV.
L. REv. 1521 (1981).
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He maintains that the "uncoupling" of shame and punishment in the
United States has been a mistake that partly explains our rising crime
rates, as compared to the low crime rates of Japan. 211 He argues,
therefore, that we should reestablish the cultural tradition of shaming
wrongdoers, and explicitly link shame and punishment. That is,
shaming not only can work, it is an essential aspect of a sound and
effective legal order and thus must be revived in the United States.
The main problem with Braithwaite's suggestion, however, and
with the contemporary revival of shaming sanctions, is that our tradition of shaming cannot be "reestablished" if the cultural conditions to
this tradition have eroded. Population increases and geographical expanse confound such efforts in the United States, and may help to
explain why Japan, as well as certain island or tribal cultures, have
continued to couple shame and punishment more effectively than the
United States has.
Other factors likewise play a role, and point against the likelihood
that shaming will deter offenders in most contemporary American settings. First, the United States as a nation is not known for the highly
developed sense of social interdependency that characterizes the Japanese212 and that appears to be an integral condition of effective
shaming.
Second, the official agents of norm enforcement often are viewed
with suspicion or hostility. Most people in the United States, especially those in large urban centers, do not see police officers or judges
as members of their "family,"213 or otherwise part of a benign network
of interconnected social actors. Impersonal, authoritarian, and detached law enforcement agents likely cannot easily substitute for the
collaborative, private, interdependent networks of social control that
tend to exist in small societies, or in morally cohesive larger societies.
Moreover, the social unit that is mainly responsible for inculcating
cultural shame values, the family, often is missing, culturally isolated,
or dysfunctional.
A third significant distinction between the United States and most
shame cultures is its cultural complexity. A federal or state judge's
jurisdiction typically extends over several subcultures, even when the
geographical region is relatively small. These subcultural variations
can give rise to different definitions of shame, which may confound
official efforts to deter crime through shaming.
211. J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 61.
212. Id. at 62, 84 (emphasizing the highly developed communitarianism in Japanese society).
213. Id. at 62-63 (contrasting the Japanese view of authority with the North American view).
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This is not to say, however, that Americans have no commonly
shared instincts about crime or about shame. A majority of Americans likely agree that most of the acts we now call crimes should be.214
For example, few American subcultures condone murder, child abuse,
or theft, though some may tolerate deviant acts more readily than
others, 215 and may construe differently the adequate justifications or
mitigating factors for these crimes. Likewise, some fairly large subcultures likely exist whose members are in substantial agreement about
certain aspects of right and wrong. Nevertheless, American subculturalism, or cultural pluralism, is pronounced enough to make broad
conclusions about our moral coherence suspect, and thus to undermine the likely effectiveness of widespread government attempts to
shame offenders, absent significant decentralization of criminal law authority and the delivery of formal norm enforcement power to the local subcultures.
A fourth and more considerable obstacle to effective shaming is
that, even where general cultural agreement exists about what acts are
wrong, significant subcultural disagreements often exist regarding
what punishments are embarrassing. For example, juvenile delinquent
subcultures, according to some writers, place excessive emphasis on
masculinity and membership. 216 Consequently, a prison sentence is
not necessarily an embarrassment to subculture members. On the
contrary, it actually can elevate a member's status within the subculture. 217 Thus, for a shaming sanction to deter offenses by juvenile
gang members, it must undermine the defendant's masculinity or compromise his gang membership, and trigger shunning by the gang. To
deter other subcultures from committing the same offenses may require quite different forms of shaming. Subcultural meanings of status
therefore influence the social meaning and general deterrence effect of
sanctions, especially for crimes that tend to be committed only or
mainly by that subculture. This means that a judge or other sentencing body must know what sanctions will improve an offender's status
position within her subculture(s), and what sanctions will harm it.218
The judge also must anticipate the strategies that people will use to
214. Id. at 39 (noting that "extreme versions of subculturalism which posit wholesale rejection of the criminal law by substantial sections of the community simply do not wash").
215. Id. at 66.
216. See, e.g., D. MATZA, supra note 204, at 53, 156-59.
217. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 83, at 216. Zimring and Hawkins quote
research interviews of gang members who claim that a member who has been in jail receives
greater respect from other members because of his prison experience. Id.
218. Cf. Probert, Creative Judicial Sanctioning: Application in the Law of Torts, 49 IOWA L.
REV. 277, 286-87 (1964) (discussing the use of alternative sanctioning in civil cases).
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avoid being deprived of that status position.21 9
An ability to predict these subcultural responses will hinge, in part,
on the extent to which the judge is connected, whether by actual or
vicarious experience, to these subcultural pattems. 220 This will depend upon the specific crime and the individual judge, among other
things. In general, however, the judicial selection process tends to
screen out candidates with actual experience in the criminal subculture, though they may acquire vicarious experience through their formal or informal education, experience on the bench, and other avenues
to this type of awareness. Absent other information to assist them,
many judges likely project their own, subcultural (predominantly
white, middle-class) estimations of shame onto the offenders, rather
than developing multiple subcultural meanings of shame. As such,
unless we adopt different procedures for selecting and training professional judges, rely more heavily on juries of offender-group "peers," or
invent alternative means of evaluating varying subcultural meanings of
shame, then the shaming sanctions that sitting criminal court judges
invent may not deter much (subculture) crime. None of these steps,
however, has accompanied the new shaming penalties.
Finally, the anthropological studies further suggest that the effectiveness of shaming as a method of norm enforcement depends partly
on whether a culture shames reintegratively. If the community has
rituals to redeem and reclaim the chastened offender afterwards, and
shaming is based in part on optimism about her responsiveness to this
grooming, then the shaming is reintegrative. The earmarks of reintegrative shame cultures include social cohesiveness, a strong family system, high communitarianism, and social control mechanisms that aim
to control by reintegration into the cohesive networks, rather than by
formal restraint. 221
These conditions, however, are not currently dominant in the
United States.222 Our legal institutions and national personality tend
to reflect the dominant American philosophical emphasis on individuality, independence, and autonomy, rather than on interdependence,
community, or shared values. Liberal values are significantly more
pronounced in American legal culture than in any of the cultures that
rely most effectively and notoriously on shame sanctions. For example, the Japanese concepts of shame to one's name and "honor," as
defined by fulfillment of social roles, fit awkwardly at best into prevail219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 286.
Id. at 287.
J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 84-85.
Id. at 86.
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ing American visions of individual personality and self-reliance. A.J?.
such, the notion that the government in criminal cases not only should
exploit cultural definitions of shame, but should attempt to forge these
definitions, would offend many Americans. Again, this strong aversion to government encroachment on individual autonomy is not our
only national tradition, nor is it the dominant one within all American
subcultures. Competing and supplemental traditions, such as the
community-oriented traditions of North American Indian tribes,
clearly exist and challenge the dominant cultural stress on "individuality." Nevertheless, the national, state and even most local cultures
lack a profound sense of mutual obligation and community.223
Braithwaite acknowledges this relative absence of optimal cultural
conditions for shaming in the United States. He nevertheless believes
that even in highly individualistic cultures such as the United States,
shaming still will reduce crime more effectively than punishment that
is unaccompanied by moralizing and denunciation. 224 But
Braithwaite's theory is based entirely on conditions that he admits are
not met in the dominant, contemporary American culture. To take
one striking example, he observes that "the way we respond to deviance, particularly crime, in the West, gives free play to degradation
ceremonies of both a formal and informal kind to certify deviance,
while providing almost no place in the culture for ceremonies to decertify deviance." 225 Despite this important admission, he adheres to his
optimistic vision of the favorable possibilities of devising shame ceremonies that are "reintegrative,'' not disintegrative. Moreover, his optimism extends to the favorable possibilities of significant revisions of
ideology; he rejects a strong embrace of individualism as too dated and
outmoded.226 He would direct the focus of norm enforcement away
from the state, and toward alternative, intermediate communities of
interest - such as the workplace, schools, or other association
223. Id. (noting that most Western societies are characterized more by individualism than
communitarianism).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 163. A more optimistic account of our criminal law process is that of James Boyd
White, who describes the criminal law as a system of meaning in which we "blame" the defendant and thereby preserve her dignity and our communal claims as well. White sees this system of
meaning as one that, even when the defendant is punished, still recognizes her as a member of the
community. J.B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: EssAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE
LAW 209 (1985). This forgiving notion of blaming corresponds with Braithwaite's "reintegrative" concept of shaming. As a normative account of just punishment, I find it attractive. As a
descriptive account of modem criminal law, I am unpersuaded. Robert Cover's account seems
more compelling. See Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) (concluding that "[l]egal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death").
226. See J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 169-70.
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contexts. 227
This is a comprehensive and utopian agenda indeed, the fulfillment
of which might well enhance the favorable possibilities of effective
shaming sanctions. But it demands root-down readjustment of the
dominant contemporary consciousness about personal responsibility
for crime control and norm observation. Short of such a profound
ideological shift, coupled with significant structural and procedural
changes to facilitate that shift, our modem state-imposed shame sanctions will lack the cultural foundations that Braithwaite himself deems
essential.
Any theory of crime control that anticipates community participation in law enforcement cannot work without at least some current
community receptiveness. A proposal such as Braithwaite's "reintegrative shaming" proposal, .which includes a shift away from stateenforced norms, clearly demands community responsiveness and accountability. The question thus is whether the community as it now
stands would respond favorably to his initiative.
One reason to be skeptical of Braithwaite's theory is suggested by
our unsuccessful experiences with rehabilitation theory and with community-based reform efforts. Rehabilitation theory experienced a decline because, inter alia, the social conditions for this theory
disappeared. For the rehabilitation approach to punishment to work,
the community must have both a "strong ... belief in the malleability
of human character and behavior," and a "working agreement on
what it means to be rehabilitated." 228 Nineteenth-century America arguably satisfied both conditions, and also was marked by a high regard
for the family. Thus, the ideal family became the model for the rehabilitative ideal, and the sanctions imposed by juvenile courts attempted
to match those of a wise parent in a family setting. 229 When this confidence in the family and consensus about rehabilitation ended, and optimism about human malleability eroded, so did confidence in the
rehabilitative ideal.230
This demise of rehabilitation theory demonstrates the link between
a community's beliefs about criminal behavior and the cultural meaning of its punishment methods. Many people today view criminals as
227. Id. at 172-73. Braithwaite remarks that a shift to communitarianism eventually may
occur because it would serve the interests of American capital. Id. at 174.
228. F. ALLEN, supra note 69, at 11.
229. Id. at 15.
230. Id. at 18-31; see also Sarat, Beyond Rehabilitation, in CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JurncE, supra note 63, at 103, 107-12 (describing complex hoot of changes in
philosophy, political climate, and social sciences that contributed to the rise and fall of the rehabilitative ideal).
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irredeemably "pathological" individuals in need of intolerably high
levels of behavioral or psychological modification or of absolute containment, not as errant fellow group members who might, through
post-act shaming and public opportunities to apologize, be reclaimed
and reintegrated. Given this attitude toward criminals, modem shaming in the United States conveys a different and less benevolent meaning than it possesses in cultures that believe in the defendant's
redemption and rehabilitation potential. Even the Puritans, with their
severe methods of exploiting social embarrassment to curb crime, acted in part out of concern for the offender's soul. Modem-day shaming, in contrast, lacks this arguably benign motive and social meaning.
The importance of existing, cultural realities to effective punishment methods - especially those that would shift norm enforcement
duties to the community - also is underscored by emerging evidence
that the community-based reform movement too has failed. Community-based reform advocates maintain that centralization and bureaucracy of law enforcement undermine the effectiveness and humaneness
of legal responses to crime, and that community-based alternatives to
state-managed institutionalization are more humane, less isolating,
and more economical.231 They often add that the community alternatives "could not be worse" than conventional corrections methods, especially prison, and so should be "given a chance."232
The actual results of these alternatives, however, are discouraging.
Instead of reducing state intervention, community-based reform seems
to expand authority and increase social control.233 The location and
agency of the control may change, but not the level or its essential
nature. Moreover, unmonitored discretion with its potential for unequal punishment is more commonplace under these programs than
under conventional state-managed programs. 234
One reason for the poor results of community-based reform lies in
its reliance on rhetoric and a romantic view of the community alternatives to traditional state-enforced punishment, rather than on a realistic and thorough appraisal of the complex nature of a shift from a
public to private system of social control. Contrary to the reformers'
assumptions, the delivery of social control to community-based agencies does not necessarily mean less pervasive, more benign, or more
effective control. Rather, these nontraditional, community-based in231. See, e.g., Lewis & Darling, The Idea of Community in Correctional Reform: How Rhetoric and Reality Join, in ARE PRISONS ANY BETIER? 95, 96-98 (J. Murphy & J. Dison eds. 1990).
232. Id. at 97-98.
233. Id. at 99.
234. Id. at 102.
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stitutions often reproduce or even exacerbate some of the perceived
shortcomings of state-managed institutions. The ongoing communitybased reform movement has faltered in part because the existing community conditions do not match the reformers' assumptions about the
community's structure, behavior, values, and beliefs.
The message for shame sanction reformers is clear. If shaming innovations likewise are premised on inflated, ethnocentric, or otherwise
inaccurate estimations of likely community responsiveness to public
punishments, then they cannot produce the favorable outcomes that
these reformers claim will occur. As I have argued, and as these past
experiences with penal reform reinforce, punishment has culture-dependent meaning and effectiveness. Reform thus requires sophisticated and realistic assessment of the present culture or cultures that
law seeks to control or influence.2 3 5
In sum, the anthropological materials suggest that for shaming to
be an effective and humane punishment technique, the culture must
match reformers' expectations. If reintegrative shaming is the goal, as
it is under Braithwaite's model, then the existing culture must be characterized by social interconnection, mutual dependency, and social cohesion. If the culture lacks these qualities, as our dominant culture
seems to, then shaming may prove as counterproductive and harsh as
spanking a child does in a family governed by authoritarianism, nonnurturance, and impersonal control.

235. Contextual analyses of disciplinary techniques in childrearing further support this
claim. Different families often establish different systems of meaning and rules, in the way that
different cultures tend to do. Studies of family patterns and discipline thus may be of interest to
penologists. Some of these studies indicate that punitive discipline in some families promotes
aggressive behavior in children. But these childrearing studies show inconsistent results, which
one author has explained as follows:
[T)he effect of punitive practices appears to be related to the severity of the practices and to
the childrearing context in which it is embedded. For example, Baumrind (1971, 1986)
reported that parents who provided a nurturant, responsive child-rearing environment, yet
maintained high standards and occasionally used power-assertive techniques, tended to rear
socially responsible boys (their girls were neither high nor low in social responsibility).
However, when parental demands were enforced in a punitive, authoritarian context, boys
exhibited relatively low levels of socially responsive behavior. Similarly, Roe (1980) found
that children's prosocial and caring behaviors toward others appeared to be unaffected by
their mothers' use of physical punishment if punishment occurred in the context of an overall positive relationship. With regard to aggressiveness, high levels of children's aggression
have been positively associated with more severe parental punitiveness such as, for example,
parental abuse of their children (George & Main, 1979; see Parke & Slaby, 1983). Thus, it is
likely that severe punitive practices, especially when embedded in a nonsupportive environment, enhance the probability of children exhibiting aggressive patterns of behavior.
Eisenberg, The Development of Prosocia/ and Aggressive Behavior, in DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN ADVANCED TEXTBOOK 461, 476 (M. Bornstein & M. Lamb 2d ed. 1988). Strictness, or sharp punitive practices, thus can be a proper punishment technique, if administered in
an appropriate family or "cultural" context.
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D. Historical Insights
The historical rise and fall of public shaming in the United States
and Western Europe lends further support to the view that the revival
of shaming is a wrong tum. Penal practices within the United States
moved away from public spectacles toward incarceration during the
nineteenth century. 236 One reason for the shift was that people came
to believe that these punishments not only were debasing; they also did
not check crime. 237 Another factor that led to abolition of these practices was a shift in attitudes toward rehabilitation as a proper and attainable goal of punishment, and toward the view that offenders would
profit from being confined and required to perform useful work, exacted in proportion to their crime.238 That is, both practical and humanistic impulses animated the rise of the penitentiary and the
movement away from the humiliatory and sanguinary punishments of
the early colonial period.
Public punishments likewise declined in Europe during the same
period. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, public spectacles had served to preserve shaky state authority, 239 insofar as state
power was not yet taken for granted. 240 Spectacle helped to reinforce
this power, in part because it was regarded as such harsh punishment;241 indeed, it was viewed as graver than physical confinement.242
A combination of post-Enlightenment intellectual and social developments in Western Europe cast doubt on the spectacle aspect ofpunishment,243 however, and contributed to its abolition. The rise of
confinement as an option,244 along with the rise of the nation-state,
reduced the perceived necessity for public executions.245 More effective, stable, and impersonal regimes led to more impersonal forms of
repression. 246 As public order became relatively well secured, authorities needed less exemplary and harsh punishment as proof of their
power. These social developments produced an environment in which
236. See 0. LEWIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONS AND PRISON CusroMS,
1776-184S, 9 (1922).
237. Id. at 9-10.
238. B. MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS 3 (1936).
239. P. SPIERENBURG, supra note 8, at SS.
240. See id. at 201.
241. See id. at 66.
242. Id. at 66-67.
243. Id. at 183.
244. Id.; see also M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 10431 (A. Sheridan trans. 1977).
24S. P. SPIERENBURG, supra note 8, at 20S.
246. Id.
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the post-Enlightenment appeals to abandon these painful spectacles finally could prevail. Similar intellectual and social developments likewise prompted changes in the United States. In 1835, the State of
New York discontinued public hangings and the rest of the states soon
followed its example.247
These historical accounts offer several messages for modem reformers. First, they suggest the limited deterrence value of shame
sanctions in that these shaming measures, though much harsher than
the modem shaming innovations, nevertheless failed to discourage offenders. Moreover, these failures occurred under conditions more
favorable to public shame methods than modem cultural conditions.
A second insight of the historical materials is that people have long
regarded public punishments as exceptionally painful. This does not
prove that they in fact are worse than private punishments, but it lends
the force of traditional estimations of cruelty to claims that they are
inhumane, and that the public may recoil at their widespread use.
The third insight of the historical materials is that resort to public
punishments often is a sign of flagging institutional or governmental
self-confidence. Disciplinary authorities who invoke public sanctions
betray insecurity about their power, and about general obedience to
their moral authority. Like the weak and ineffective teacher who
forces misbehaving students to stand in the comer, wear dunce caps,
or endure other humiliatory measures, the government that resorts to
public shame measures may reveal itself to be an ineffective, even desperate, authority. That is, the modem revival of shaming may be a
symptom of impotence in our formal institutions of social control.
But, if history is a guide, it suggests that a revival of formalized shaming is not a sound means of rebuilding that authority.

E. Institutional Constraints and Other Practical Concerns
Finally, even if the foregoing objections to shaming could be overcome, the sanction might still prove impractical for several reasons.
First, if the penalty were to become a common sanction, it may produce a shaming overload, which could reduce public interest in these
displays and thereby lessen the deterrence impact. This decline in
public interest could prove expensive to monitor. At least three million people pass through the state and federal corrections systems each
year. 248 Approximately two thirds of the offenders who are under cor247. G. Scorr, supra note 82, at 58.
248. See R. CARTER, R. McGEE & E. NELSON, CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA 1 (1975). The
current figures likely are much higher than these 1975 figures reflect.
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rectional supervision are on probation or parole, and thus have been
returned to the community. 249 If only one half of this two thirds was
sentenced to shame sanctions, this still might involve one million
shamings per year for the government to publish and for the public to
consume.
Daily announcements of criminal incidents, which appear in many
local newspapers, thus would expand considerably. At first glance,
though, this may seem a workable and relatively inexpensive alternative to prison, despite the high number of shamings. Government
might exploit television, radio, newspapers, billboards, as well as other
communication vehicles to announce criminal conduct. All of these
methods - except perhaps televised shaming - probably would cost
far less than incarceration, supervised probation, or rehabilitative
therapy.
These penalties would soon be ignored, however. The main reason
that most of the modem shaming sanctions described in this Article
have garnered media attention is that they are curiosities, and hence
newsworthy. This interest surely would wane if shaming became commonplace. That is, shaming is an inherently short-fused sanction.
The primary problem with a dramatic increase in the number of
shamings thus would not be the initial cost of implementing or monitoring shaming punishments, but the practical problem of how to measure and respond to changes in public reactions to the shaming of one
million offenders a year. For example, the court would need to assess
whether and when the public would begin to ignore this flood of information. Public curiosity at first might be high, but likely would not
endure. Moreover, in major metropolitan areas the shaming ads
might occupy enough space to warrant addition of a pull-out section
of the newspaper, which might easily be tossed aside, unread, along
with other newspaper inserts. To avoid this, courts might adopt different types of shaming. For example, a judge may instead impose homecentered shamings, such as lawn signs or bumper stickers. These more
localized shamings, however, would entail more localized, "customized" shaming impact assessments.
Evaluations of public responses to various types of shaming might
resemble the public opinion surveys, market research, or other assessments of popular opinion that businesses or politicians commonly
must make to sell or promote their products or themselves. Sophisticated work in this area likely costs more, and involves more specialized expertise, than reformers may imagine. Yet if states fail to
249. Id. at 11.
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undertake this kind of analysis, then shaming sanctions are unlikely to
maintain the deterrence impact that is their primary justification.250
Even if shamings were well-publicized and did continue to command significant public attention, however, they might affect the public's reaction to crimes and criminals in ways that the shame sanction
advocates may not have anticipated, and may not desire. As I have
indicated, most punishment now tends to take place out of public
view. 251 This is especially true in densely populated urban settings,
where anonymity and disinterest in others' lives often are governing
rules of public interpersonal relations. Accordingly, the community
can distance itself psychologically from the process and results of punishment. 252 This distancing is reinforced by the fact that the few
criminals who are personalized and who do come to popular attention
are the particularly grotesque, bizarre, or flamboyant offenders. 253
Public shaming, by definition, would mean wider public exposure
to punishment, and hence to a greater number of less sensational defendants. Assuming that the criminal sanctions were imposed evenly,
then at least for offenses that touch a cross-section of the population
- such as drunk driving, shoplifting, spouse and child abuse, or tax
fraud - the public would directly confront the impact of legal sanctions on the lives of people with whom more people can empathize.
Several practical effects, some adverse, might flow from this
"deprivatization" of criminal law. It would of course bring the gravity
of these offenses home to more people. This, in fact, is what the sane250. Other practical and fairness problems also may emerge. For example, if courts resorted

to home-centered shamings, such as lawn signs, neighboring property owners likely would object.
They first might attempt to drive the offender from the neighborhood. If she refused to move,
however, the property owners likely would resent the judge who imposed the sentence and could
complain about, if not sue over, the stigma spillover onto these innocent neighbors. Cabining the
effects of these customized shame sanctions thus could be quite complicated. Assuring that all
shame sanctions had some effect, and continued to do so, however, would be more complicated.
At present, courts have no mechanisms for conducting such inquiries. These mechanisms,
though, would need to be explored before widespread use of shaming could proceed.
251. See supra note 210.
252. For a discussion of the psychological works that describe the role of identification with
another person and empathy for her, see Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1574 (1987).
253. Occasionally, a sympathetic figure will capture public attention. A devoted elderly husband will end a spouse's misery, or a wrongly accused person will be vindicated and released.
More often, however, the offenders who receive concentrated mainstream or tabloid attention are
people like Richard Ramirez, who murdered 13 people in southern California and who, we are
told, on one occasion "gouged out the eyes of the victim." See Court in Los Angeles Gives 'Night
Stalker' Death in 13 Killings, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1989, at Al8, col. 5. The news account
reported that shortly before he was sentenced to die in the gas chamber he made a statement that
included remarks like "Lucifer dwells within us all," and "I am beyond evil." Id. Such selective
accounts of criminal court business enable the public to see criminals as alien "others" and to
favor quite strict crime control measures.
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tioners hope will occur. The stronger our identification with the offender the greater our sense that we could end up in her same
predicament. This certainly might deter others from committing similar crimes, which likely is the principal aim of the shame sentence. On
the other hand, however, public discomfort and strong identification
with offenders254 might also result in public resistance to the sanction,
and thus a softening of the criminal laws, or even a call for reprivatization,255 as is evidenced by the demise of public spectacles in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe. These consequences, of
course, may not seem undesirable to all observers. My point here is
that I doubt that reformers have taken them into account.
Public reactions to public shaming sanctions thus likely would be
variable and complex. They would hinge on the nature of the sanction, the identity of the offenders, the character of the crime, and the
perceived identification of the target audience with the offender. Audience acceptance of and cooperation in this "ritual" may be far more
unpredictable and various than the judges and legislators who favor
shaming sanctions suppose. Public sanctioning may even, in some
cases, lead to an increase in violation of laws. The superficial appeal of
this revival, upon closer inspection, thus begins to erode when one
looks deeper at the nature of shanie, the cultural context in which
shaming has been "revived," and the multiple practical, institutional,
and situational problems that may emerge.

F. Middle-Class Offenders: Windows of Shaming Opportunity?
Despite the foregoing arguments against shaming, some readers
likely remain persuaded that a good public spanking will "work" for
some offenders. One population of lawbreakers in particular strongly socialized, middle-class offenders - may seem especially vulnerable to shaming because it tends to satisfy most of the cultural,
psychological, and other conditions of shaming. Thus, some people
would argue, shaming may make sense as a means of controlling bad
behavior in this pocket of moral cohesion.
The argument that middle-class offenders will respond to shame
sanctions has some force. Middle-class members likely most fear loss
of social status, both because they have such status to lose and because
254. Increased identification with offenders contributed to the demise of public executions in
Europe. Pieter Spierenburg states, in his study of public executions and other public punishments in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Amsterdam, that "[b]y the end of the eighteenth century some of the audience could feel the pain of delinquents on the scaffold. . . . [I]nterhuman identification had increased." P. SPIERENBURG, supra note 8, at 184.
255. The public resistance to spectacle punishment in Europe led to the decline of public
punishment, not of punishment in general; that is, it led to privatization. See id.
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it is precariously balanced. The members of this group have not attained, and most likely never will attain, the immunity from shunning
and ostracism that exceptional wealth or high social standing affords.
Acquisition of exceptional wealth, enough to elevate one to upperclass status, seldom occurs in one lifetime. Movement of this sort usually involves high risk behavior, entrepreneurial genius, or exceptional
good luck - all low frequency occurrences. High social standing is
even harder to obtain. Typically, it is inherited and immutable.
Although marriage can enhance one's social standing, the elevation is
less authentic, less stable, and not always generally acknowledged.
Thus, elevation to a demonstrably higher social class is simply not
possible for the vast majority of middle-class or lower middle-class
people.
Demotion to a lower social class, in contrast, is always a distinct
possibility. Middle-class status typically hinges on steady income and
observation of middle-class rules of behavior. Loss of one's job, major
illness, divorce, or notorious violation of middle-class norms, without
more, can precipitate a slide into the lower class. Middle-class offenders thus may seem to be "ideal" targets for shaming sanctions. They
are the people most likely to worry about public appearances, to be
vulnerable to moralistic or judgmental social groups, to defer to authority, and to be relatively conventional in attitudes toward "law and
order." Thus, for crimes that are likely to be committed by middleclass people, the shaming sanctions may work best, if they work anywhere. These crimes would include, among others, drinking offenses,
driving offenses, embezzlement, drug offenses, spouse abuse, child
abuse, and tax fraud.
Even here, though, the many practical limitations of the sort I already have named may surface and undermine the effectiveness of the
shaming tactics. The middle class is subject to the same range of intraclass personality deviations, individualized meanings of shame, and
unpredictable responses to shame sanctions as are other subcultures.
Childrearing practices, to name one of many variables that influence
the shame phenomenon, vary widely among members of the middle
class. Also, even middle-class offenders likely are not as conventional
or susceptible to shame as we imagine. For example, in State v. Rosenberger, 256 the defendant had held a respectable position with American
Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T). Rosenberger stole two AT&T
checks, totaling $375,000, and deposited them into his personal checking account. The defendant argued that his "shame and disgrace" in
256. 207 N.J. Super. 350, 504 A.2d 160 (1985).
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being convicted was sufficient punishment. Judge Imbriani rejected
this argument for the following pertinent reasons:
[The defendant] had minimal roots anywhere and lived in Bound Brook
for only two years prior to this offense. After being fired by AT & T he
moved to California and quickly obtained a new and equally lucrative
position. There is no evidence that he is now shunned socially, financially or otherwise. He still earns as much as he did at AT & T and it is
probable that his new neighbors are totally unaware of his criminal conduct. So where is the shame? With whom has he been disgraced? How
has he been punished? It is apparent that he simply moved his employment and residence 3,000 miles and continued his same life style without
so much as a hitch.251

That is, even some members of the middle class, especially in large
cities, may not care enough about what "society" thinks to make
shaming a demonstrably more effective tool than mere conviction and
customary punishments. Residential and occupational mobility, coupled with a generally eroded sense of community, can undermine the
effectiveness of stigma punishments, even for the social groups traditionally most sensitive to stigma.

G. Conclusion
The meaning of any punishment is partly contextual. The penitentiary, to the Quakers, was a benign invention, meant to redeem the
prisoner, not torture her. 258 Given modem cultural conditions, the
meaning of shame sanctions is not benign. Rather, the message of
modem shaming is predominantly harsh and disintegrative, not reintegrative. It is likely to be construed by the viewers, and experienced by
the offender, as purely retributive - not rehabilitative or redemptive.
And if it does deter anyone, it likely will deter most effectively those
people for whom conviction and conventional punishments are threatening enough.
Braithwaite probably is correct when he says that "[y]ou cannot
take the moral content out of social control and expect social control
to work. If there is no morality about the law, if it is just a game of
rational economic tradeoffs, cheating will be rife." 259 But his assumption that a society that replaces conventional punishment with reintegrative shaming will have less crime260 seems unduly optimistic. It
also ignores the extent to which a "punitive" practice in one context
may be "reintegrative" in another and vice versa. The more promising
257. 207 N.J. Super. at 356-58, 504 A.2d at 164.
258. See T. DUMM, DEMOCRACY AND PUNISHMENT 65 (1987).
259. J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 99, at 142.
260. Id. at 80.
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sequence for his brand of reform is for informal, nongovernment institutions first to reconstitute a consensus about moral behavior and next
to establish mechanisms for effective negative and positive reinforcement of behavior. Decentralization of authority, revitalization of family bonds and communal bonds, and a more robust sense of
interdependence and responsibility to others thus should precede, or at
least accompany, any legislative or judicial attempt to shame people
into norm observation. Absent these preliminary and formidable
steps, a formal shaming sanction is unlikely to convey the moral content Braithwaite desires. Rather, it will represent a purely retributive
slap by an unforgiving and impersonal authority, and a feeble form of
criminal justice.
VII.

HUMANENESS FACTORS

The combination of stigma and loss of liberty that inheres in criminal
punishment represents a net loss in human dignity and autonomy. It is
tempting to contemplate avoidance of that loss.... [O]ther things being
equal, we should prefer punishments that do not entail stigma and loss of
liberty to those that do. 2 61

A. Introduction
In the preceding sections, I explored whether shaming is likely to
promote valid punishment ends, in theory and in practice. In this final
section, I consider whether the shaming sanctions are reasonably humane. The humaneness of a penalty depends on a host of factors, including whether it is proportional to the crime, is administered in an
even-handed manner across offenders, and is not exceptionally degrading or cruel. 262
261. H. PACKER, supra note 66, at 255.
262. I do not address the constitutional arguments against such sanctions, which of course
are particularized fairness arguments, because other writers already have done so. See, e.g.,
Note, supra note 42, at 658-60; Note, The Modem Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of
Modem Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357, 1376-78, 1381-84; Note, ''Scarlet Letter"
Punishment: Yesterday's Outlawed Penalty is Today's Probation Condition, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
613, 624-34 (1988); Note, Sentenced to Wear the Scarlet Letter: Judicial Innovations in Sentencing - Are They Constitutional?, 93 DICKINSON L. REV. 759 (1989).
One of the principal constitutional objections is based on the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Constitutional arguments also might be based on the
due process and equal protection clauses, on the first amendment, and on the right to privacy.
Resolution of these constitutional points should depend, to a large degree, on how courts resolve
the proportionality, equality, and dignity concerns raised in the following sections. As the Court
in Hutto v. Finney explained: "The Eighth Amendment's ban on inflicting cruel and unusual
punishments ..• 'proscribe[s] more than physically barbarous punishments' . . • • It prohibits
penalties that are grossly disproportionate to the offense, ..• as well as those that transgress
today's 'broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.' "
437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).
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All existing forms of punishment violate these principles to some
degree, insofar as state-imposed punishment is an inexact, unevenly
experienced, and often highly coercive response to norm violations.
Nevertheless, the elusiveness of shame, the unreflective way in which
the new shaming sanctions have been developed, and the serious harm
to human dignity that truly effective shaming can cause, all suggest
that the fairness objections to official shunning and shame are particularly compelling.
B. Proportionality
Proportionality of a penalty can be assessed in at least two ways:
the punishment can be matched to the crime, ignoring offender-specific variations, or the punishment can be matched to the crime, taking
into account offender-specific mitigating factors, such as remorse.
For a punishment under either account to "match" the crime,
though, it must be a measurable sanction. With shaming, the harm to
the offender is almost wholly intangible and cannot be assessed. Psychological studies of shame indicate that the same stimulus may produce deep shame in some offenders and no shame in others. Thus, to
the extent that punishment is justified both as a negative and a proportional reaction to crime, shaming may offend both qualities: it may
not, for some offenders, be "negative" at all, and the same stimulus
may not be experienced equally by equally culpable actors.
This latter objection, of course, is hardly unique to shaming penalties; the impact of money fines, incarceration or any other penalty is
felt unevenly as well. Likewise, shame is a potential, often likely, consequence of all forms of public punishment. The question, however, is
not whether peripheral and disproportional stigmatizing already is
part of the criminal process, but whether it is a desirable part that
should be augmented and exploited. That other penalties may produce similar untoward consequences does not make these objections
pointless when applied to shaming. Also, most conventional punishments involve at least some measurable, transsituational factors, such
as the hours of community service, the months spent in prison, or the
dollars assessed as a fine. Judges thus can be reasonably confident
both about whether a penalty has been imposed, and whether the dosage of the penalty is increasing, regardless of the offender's personality
or social circumstances. Money and time, at least, are susceptible to
numerical estimations; embarrassment, ego strength, and social standing defy quantitative assessment.
Another proportionality concern is that the stigma of shaming
may be irreversible. This possibility presumably would have to be
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taken into account in the court's or legislature's proportionality assessment. Fear of the peripheral and long-lasting effects of stigma associated with all punishments has convinced some penologists that
officials should try to contain, not enhance, the publicity and labeling
aspect of a criminal sanction.2 6 3 With new shaming sanctions, however, judicial efforts to confine the shame to a discrete time period are
unlikely to work. On the contrary, such efforts seem inconsistent with
the effort to publicize the punishment. Once an offense becomes notorious, the public will do as it chooses with the information, regardless
of official admonitions. This would be especially true in work and social relationships, where shunning might be acute for some offenders.
Officials also must consider the potential unfairness of stigma spillover. Whenever a person is sanctioned, the negative impact may extend to her family or other associates. This spillover effect is
augmented when the offense is widely publicized or sensationalized.
For example, one study of prisoners' wives' feelings of shame indicates
that the wives were particularly embarrassed when their spouse's behavior and conviction were publicized in the local news media. 264 Expanded use of public shaming surely would deliver more convincing
blows to these innocent others' reputations than conventional punishment methods already tend to. Although this could enhance the deterrence impact of a shaming sentence, at least to the extent that
would-be offenders care about bringing disgrace to their intimate associates and kin, this does not necessarily entitle lawmakers or judges to
exploit this apprehension.
One likely response to all of these proportionality objections is that
they rely on individual-specific factors. Proportionality might instead
be defined as matching the sanction to the offense, not to the offender. 265 The "eye for an eye" might be estimated not on the basis of
263. See N. wALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER AND STIGMA: THE MORALITY OP CRIMI·
NAL JUSTICE 147 (1980) (noting that many countries today have laws designed to limit the
stigma of a conviction, by allowing for official expurgation of the record).
264. Fishman, Stigmatization and Prisoners' Wives' Feelings of Shame, 9 DEVIANT BEHAV.
169, 174 (1988).
265. The recently adopted Federal Sentencing Guidelines take this approach in part, by
deeming offender-specific characteristics such as education and vocational skills, family ties and
responsibilities, and community ties as "not ordinarily relevant" in sentencing. U.S. SENTENC·
ING CoMMN., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5Hl.2, 5Hl.6, at 240-41
(1988). The guidelines do regard as relevant the defendant's "acceptance of responsibility" for
her criminal conduct. Id. at§ 3El.1, at 197. They list as evidence of this acceptance specific
conduct, not mere verbal expressions of regret or responsibility. Id. More to the point of this
Article, a federal commission that in the 1970s debated reforms offederal criminal law expressly
considered and rejected the "publicity" sanctions "as inappropriate with respect either to organizations or to individuals, despite its possible deterrent effect, since it came too close to the adoption of a policy approving social ridicule as a sanction." NATL. COMMN. ON REFORM OP FED.
CRIM. LAWS, FINAL REPORT,§ 3007, Comment (1971).
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actual shame experienced by the offender and her family, but on how
much shame an average member of the community might or should
feel if she were ordered to wear the same sign. Thus, proportionality
inquiries would become less complex, at least insofar as the limitless
range of individual shades of shame would not need to be consulted or
reckoned.
The problem with this alternative is that these shaming schedules
still would need to identify and grade an intensely slippery variable.
The "cultural meaning of shame" within the United States is exceedingly amorphous, if indeed one national meaning exists. Neither legislators nor judges are likely to be able to define this variable accurately,
let alone determ.it}e the precise spectacle that will match both the culture's definitions of shame and the gravity of the offense. 266 For example, on what possible basis might a sentencing reform commission
decide that holding a sign in public was a proportional punishment for
child molestation? Or, if a trial judge were to devise this sentence,
how might the appellate court handle the defendant's argument that
this sanction was not proportional to the crime? A coherent, articulable argument that a sign sanction is, or is not, "proportional" to this
offense is difficult to imagine.
Equally difficult to express would be reasons for distinguishing
more severe shaming sanctions from less harsh ones. Certainly, holding a sign in public for one week seems worse than a one-day sentence,
but this is for reasons distinct from the shaming aspect of the sanction;
for example, the deprivation of liberty would be greater. If everyone
in town, or at least everyone significant to the offender, saw her during
the first hour, then the subsequent hours would be irrelevant to the
sanction's stigmatic impact, though liberty interests would become a
stronger factor. Even if only one person saw the offender during the
first hour, the stigma effect may be spread by that witness' relating the
incident to others. In any event, the full measure of the stigma probably would be met at a certain threshold, after which "more shaming,"
"longer shaming," or wider publication would not matter much to the
offender's reputation or sense of shame. Widespread, effective publication of the shaming probably would cause that shame threshold to be
266. Again, however, I am not arguing that we have no shared consensus of "right or
wrong," but that "shame" is a particularly elusive phenomenon. For example, the "cultural
meaning" of other wrong conduct - such as race discrimination - may be susceptible to judicial interpretation in ways that the cultural meaning of shame is not. Cf Lawrence, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 355-62
(1987) (arguing that racially discriminatory acts have a cultural meaning that courts are capable
of construing).
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reached more quickly than ineffective publication, but it may not influence the final impact of disclosure.
Thus, for those observers who regard proportionality as a crucial
and tight limitation on punishment, the stigma consequences of any
punishment are undesirable because they are beyond our ability to
control, measure, or justify rationally. Either we must take the varying contextual aspects of stigma into account, which demands a degree
of sophistication that we currently lack, or we must try to minimize or
contain it despite any potential sacrifice of deterrent efficacy. 267
C. Equality

Erving Goffman once wrote that "the more power and prestige the
others have, the more a person is likely to show considerations for
their feelings." 268 To the extent that shame sanctions are "custom
designed" to the offender, and not part of any sentencing guidelines,
they thus are subject to the abuse of unequal application. If judges
have discretion to fashion creative sentences, they may be inclined to
deliver harsher sentences to some defendants than to others. 269
The modem revivals of shaming are not part of comprehensive
shame schedules, but seem instead to be episodic, almost whimsical
bursts of judicial, legislative, or prosecutorial inspiration. One significant danger in such an ad hoc approach is that the "test group" for
shaming will be the offenders with the least political or other means of
objecting or retaliating. More powerful offenders may receive alternative sanctions like "community service," or fines.
The risk of unequal application of shame sanctions might be controlled by requiring that legislatures adopt mandatory sentencing
guidelines, applied evenly to all offenders. But, as the current debates
about mandatory sentencing in the federal system show, this form of
equality can compromise equality in other senses. 27° For example, the
267. See N. WALKER, supra note 263, at 161. Walker suggests a third alternative, but it
would not apply to shame punishments. This alternative would be for the punisher to simply
ignore the unofficial stigma effect of the punishment, and demand only that the official punishment be proportional. Id. With shame punishments, of course, the official punishment is the
stigma.
268. E. GOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 10 n.3.
269. See E. POWERS, supra note 161, at 195-96 (noting that it was the poorer thieves, drunk·
ards, and liars who were suitable candidates for the stocks; respected citizens were more likely to
be fined).
270. The deeper equality issues at stake with shaming sanctions, like those at stake with
sanctions generally, are virtually insoluble. In another context, Jencks has explored the elusive
meaning of "equal treatment" in terms that demonstrate several potential "inequalities" in delivering equal punishments to all offenders. He demonstrates, through a concrete example, the
extent to which the meaning of equality depends on one's theory of justice. For example, a
utilitarian will demand a different sort of equality than someone who embraces a moralistic the-
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legislature could insist that every person who steals $200 worth of
goods be compelled to stand for one hour in the town square with a
sign that reads "I am a thief." This would satisfy one rather static
definition of equality. The only factor relevant to the punishment decision would be whether the same offense had been committed. But if
one offender stole $200 worth of groceries for her family, and the other
stole a $200 stereo, then a different sense of equality would be offended. Similarly, if one offender, who had never before stolen anything in her life and enjoyed widespread public respect, were facing
her first criminal charge, whereas the other had a string of prior property offenses and had a reputation as a thief, then the hour in the
square for the first would not be the same as the hour in the square for
the second. One could, of course, simply define equality as "same offense - same sign." But to do so would compromise other important
meanings of equality.
This problem, of course, is pervasive. Individualized approaches
to criminal law enforcement will always both promote and defeat
equality objectives, no matter what sanction we impose. No plausible
sentencing schedule can anticipate the entire range of the individual
factors that may determine the impact of a sanction. This aspect of
the equality dilemma may be especially profound with shaming sanctions, however, because "shame" is elusive and intensely offender-specific. Also, if judges did take the individualized meaning of a shame
sanction into account, this could lead to the "unfair" result that prominent, white collar or upper-class offenders, who have more social status to lose, would receive milder sentences than less prominent lowerclass offenders.271 Yet if this individualized meaning is ignored, this
could lead to unduly punitive sentences for some offenders, beyond
any plausible specific or even general deterrence needs.
At present, the modem shame sanctions violate both senses of
equality. They are neither part of a general, equally administered sentencing scheme, nor the product of reflective, individualized estimations of the offender's sense of shame. We do not know, for example,
why the Rhode Island judge ordered Stephen Germershausen, but not
other sex offenders, to place an ad in the newspaper for his offense.
ory of justice. As applied to punishment generally, and to shaming in particular, Jencks' discussion shows that the "equality" of punishment depends on whether we focus principally on the
offender or on society as a whole. Jencks, Whom Must We Treat Equally for Educational Opportunity to be Equal?, 98 ETHICS 518 (1988).
271. See State v. Rosenberger, 207 N.J. Super. 350, 358, 504 A.2d 160, 165 (1985) (noting
that white-collar criminals stand a significantly lower chance of serving a long sentence if convicted than do bank robbers); Bramwell, Alternative Sentencing or Part-Time Imprisonment Is
Discriminatory, 26 How. L.J. 1265, 1268 (1983) (arguing that "[a]ltematlve sentencing creates a
two-tier system of justice and is indicative of basic unfairness and favoritism").
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Nothing in the reported account of his sentence suggests that the judge
selected Germershausen for this sentence because he was unusually
likely to respond to this type of sentence, or because he deserved it
more than other offenders. Rather, the judge simply wanted to set an
example; equality concerns were not part of her stated sentencing
calculus. This is a serious omission, however, and raises the strong
concern that the revival of shaming may violate the principle of evenhanded punishments.
D.

Cruelty

The final fairness concern is the most difficult to define, though it
makes immediate intuitive sense and may best capture the potential
offense of an effective shaming sanction. When a shame sanction hits
home, it is a direct assault on a basic need of all people, 272 the esteem
of others. The troublesome inquiry is whether we should approve of
government punishment that is principally designed to withdraw this
esteem. In other words, is this type of dehumanizing punishment too
"cruel" to be an acceptable sanction?
A common response to this concern is that the criminal has bargained away, or sacrificed involuntarily, her social standing in exchange for the projected fruits of her criminal activity. Social stability
demands that public officials impose the burden of shame and guilt on
those who defy basic, shared rules of civility and order. Some people
thus argue that if some individuals' self-esteem is lost through the
criminal process, then their loss is justified by our collective interest in
our mutual protection, freedom, and well-being. Some may even argue that the offender's dignity is affirmed by holding her accountable
for her actions, because this implies a belief that she is a rational, autonomous person.
As far as it goes, and as general as it is, the argument makes considerable sense. The argument depends, of course, on one's views
about the etiology of crime, the effectiveness of degradation in curbing
future behavior, and the danger of state-imposed punishments aimed
directly at wounding offender's self-esteem and social standing. But
even if we accept that government-imposed self- esteem losses are justifiable under some punishment circumstances, we still must determine
whether a particular method of withdrawing that esteem produces adequate public good to justify these individual harms.
This resolution turns several factors. First, it hinges on the nature
of the wound that punishment inflicts. Psychological studies of shame
272. See
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are important to this inquiry because they disclose how serious the
harm of effective shaming may be. The likely practical consequences
of shaming also are important because they determine whether the
competing societal interest warrants this potential assault on human
dignity. Taken together, the likely practical advantages of shaming
seem to be far less than its proponents imagine. Indeed, they may be
negligible. This suggests that the balance of community versus individual offender concerns may tip decidedly in favor of the offender in
the case of shame sanctions.
One could reach this same conclusion simply by arguing that it is
always immoral to intentionally degrade a human being. This argument, though, would render any punishment scheme "immoral," a result I regard as senseless, in both practical and moral terms. When we
wound others - by robbing, assaulting, driving recklessly, cheating,
or otherwise - we can expect and in some sense deserve rebuke. This
rebuke may well lower our social standing, and hence compromise our
self-image. If we deny states the power to injure one's social standing,
we deny them the power to convict and punish criminals. I would
oppose such a result, as would most people. Nonetheless, whenever
we place the power to rebuke in the hands of the government, liberalism reminds us to be extremely wary of that authority, and to demand that the power be exercised minimally, uniformly, and subject to
constant reexamination and supervision.
State-enforced shaming authorizes public officials to search for and
destroy or damage an offender's dignity. Aggressive use of such authority may be an Orwellian prospect, particularly when reintegration
is not part of the punishment process. Absent far more compelling
evidence than we currently possess that shaming would produce demonstrably better results than conventional punishments, then, shaming should not become part of the sentencer's arsenal.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Jurists and legislators have good reason to be frustrated by the failures of past attempts to find effective, humane, and economic punishment techniques. But shaming sanctions are not the solution. We
cannot wish away the absence of cultural conditions that might make
shaming a meaningful cultural ritual. We likewise cannot ignore the
profound harm that effective shaming, where it can be achieved, may
cause.
The historical demise of public shaming in dominant Western culture was prompted by rationalistic and humanistic instincts. The experiences that gave rise to those instincts should inform modem
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attempts to fashion rational, humane criminal punishment. They caution against widespread revival of the pillory and stocks in the United
States. Absent thoroughgoing changes in the nature of the modem
state, in criminal court procedures and personnel, and in the dominant
culture's conception of the relationship between the individual and her
community, the modem shaming sanctions will not work. At best,
they are likely to prove futile, even silly, responses to crime. At worst,
they may become highly destructive, state-imposed assaults on human
personality.

